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. 01v111.an defence 1·s. an alternative to military defence., 
~ · ·. In the l~ght of some ol~ims that military defence is . 
''>. -f.!..~.4- l 
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': ·-. --.-.· 
. . i ( ... ·, .. ina.dequately equipped, to defend a nation-state·, method\' . .-. L 
,l, .•. 
of al. ternative defence are t_hought to/be needed. Civili_aD. · . -- ' -~ ~· 
defence seeks to divest the state of a def'enc.e system which 
is an economic liability and which may not be· able to perf·orm 
>'., ....... its function when rE!quired., as happened to the Ozephoslovakian 
armed forces in 1938 .a.nd 1.968. Civilian defence· is 1 .to .. be 
distinguish~d from civil defence wh·ich is based on fall,.eut 
shelters, urban evacuation, and ·"other modes of passive .. 
-·· .. ~ . 
resistance. 
\ The method of d~fence is to prepare an unarmed _popula-
tion for active participation in its own defence by means of I 
V 
non-cooperation, resistance to th..e attacker I s officials, . . . \ 
soldiers, .. and. values, and of sabotage. I~ is hoped that . th.e 9" 
' 
. 
' . 
_ .. 
0 -
.: "s,• 
' 
w'orld-wide dissemination of the civilian ·defence state's j . \ 
, · · peaceful and unprovocative intentions, and. of the P.robabilities 
of· successful resistance .to attack, l{ill det·er-~·any state from 
attacking. Deterrence is preferable to defensive ac~ion., but 
}~ 
~:· ... i)iH failure d.o8s not necessarily mean defeat for the civilian ,I 
' 
·-.I i de'fence stat·e any ~o~e than J. t does for a .mil! tary defence 
' 1!I ..... . · ~---s·tate. 
- ,:::!! ., 
' The G>r1g1ns , ·o! civilian defence lie in. religious and 
metaphysical beliefs 1n pacifism and. non-violence./-Its ··main • • • .!: 
forerunner is ·Gandhi who used non-violent· me.thoq.s to help 
., 
.· . ..:., 
> secure -national independence for India. The concept of civilian·· 
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; 
. ·resi'stance·· as a ,syst_em ·of nat;"1onal defence 1·s nel,f and by no \ ,, . 
I • . . . ~ 'ti 
• r 
"' .~' n;ieans f ormS ·a complete · and coherent· 'theory. Many aspects .. of· . -- r 
. itsf operation, and their implications, need c;riitiCal and he~:p-
) 
. ·, ,· ,., 
~- ·\ , 
• 
·" ,.·. 
. .. 
· ful study. . "-
. 
. -~ Like conventi·onal d.isarmament, civ.ilian defence wo1lld 
( 
'· . I 
have a profou1:1d impac1; on the social and political structure 
· of the state, perhaps---so. sweeping as to alter the nature of , 
-the s.tate. · But·, the only basis fo;r evalu·at1on is the· practical 
· application of civilian qe·fence to the prevailing, unaltered 
structures of nation-states. The armed forces would be disarmed 
r 
, and forced to seek a new role; the economy would have to convert 
~ts armaments industries to peaceful production; the dangers 
. ., 
. 
. ' 
. of economic and \political centralisation might be increased,r·· . , 
. 
but the individual would be re·quired to participate more fully 
in his own governance, as well as .in his own defence. 
The most serious defect of civilian defence. is tha·~- 1 t 
does not fit into the present structure of international rela-• 
•. 
. 
u 
t_ions, nor '·does it seem likely to in the foreseeable future • 
. 'It is not a defensive system which the U.S.A. or the U.S.:S.R. 
. " can adopt and, indeed, there are ve~y __ few states wp.ich have 
ever considered it, and t·-ewer to which 1 t might now be appli- ___ _£"-
(l, 
.. cable. Br1~a1n, Iceland, and Costa -Rica are states which siat:ts·;;;··--· -
-fy some but by no. means 
6 
all of the cri te,ria for the adop-tion·/ ,"K',' 
···or a policy of civilia.n ·defe11ce. 
' 
. I , 1 
~- .~~-
.... 
"';,,,.: 
./. 
. ,,. 
'· 
.. . 
~---.:. '· 
' I 
·,, ' ' 
: ...... ;:. , ....... .. 
. .• 
,: '\ 
'•.·, 
... ..., . 
. . 
\ .... .. ,· 
. ) 
- . 
' 
-·,"'--
t 
I . )' 
.. -, 
' , ..... 
• 
,. ' ' ·-. . 
... .-, •... ; ..... ' ,, 
·-.~, .. -:.~.·~~:ti~:,~;.;,.1-.~~,,~t, .. i.;,t...,,~i...'t'fT"'"" _
_
 .... _.,:. ___ ,. ____ .,. __ .... _:..__. _____________________ ... ,-.· ,,,.--~·-·· .• ·.·.~-;...,._·.· .. ·-.. -•..• ·.-•. -... •,•····· .. • .. -.·.·.·,.·--······--•• ·-·--· iiiiiiiiiiiiliiiiiiiiiiiilill. -· iiiiiiiiliiililiiiiliiiiililiiiiiiiliiliialllliiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiaiiiiiiiiiiiii. ~iiiiiiiiiliiiiiiiailililill ..... ----~ -- -~ -~~--~--~---·"'- -,·,.~-·" .,.,·,-..  ,.- .. ,~._.__,.. ... s--- .·'-.-'. · .. ·t,.·"-':-.,._' .... ,------ ... ·~.-~···,.··,~·,"·---~-, ... --.·r- .. -- .... "·"'"""""'·' ,· .. i,·-,,,.,7, .. ·vn,·----·- ··---·--- -· ·.' 
:1:.:.:.1_' ,,( 
. j
1i I.I ' ~ ' 
tj_· ;\ 
1_J l~, 
r' 
!.
{ 
l 
f; 
I) )/ 
,! 
'\ _j 
-
···-·"'·'"' ... -----
-
... '. 
.• 
-
-~ 
.• 
·.,_:·· 
,. 
-·:. 
:.:k; 
~-
.. . 
-
--~--
--~ 
·.t· 
j:_ 
.·,,:" 
• 
1--
.... 
c .. , ... 
_It. 
r 
-·~. 
... 
·~--
---.,.;. 
'• .. 
,(, 
. I. 
__ .: ______ _ 
... 
..... 
't ··•· .. 
,.';:,..:. .... :· ... ' .. · 
' . \ 
.... 
I• 
.......... 
,, __ . __ 
.:; 
lh.. .. · 
-,; 
•. 
.. 
P•' 
~ 
...... ,c.,, 
"T_"'. 
We la.11:ghed ,· knowing that better men would come, 
And.greater wars; when each proud fighter brags 
He wars on Death-- for liTes; not men-- for flaga. 
' . 
· .. ; 
~..f.: 
., 
.Wilfred Owen: ''The Next War"· 
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, Philoe-ephical and Ethical· ... Qp.eetio11a ~ ' 
. ,_ 
" 
. ' 
-Ou.r f .. irst area of inves.tigation will ·b• _the phile.:.-
., ,,.-
• I 
------- •!-Phical underpinnings of theories of war, conflict, and 
- ' " //_;// . -
/I' 
.\,./-' 
non-Tiolence. We will l~ok at the underlying assumptions· 
and abstract judgements from which are derived_ so·lutione 
.. to ~he preblema o.f man and.war. We.need not be quite as.· 
••phatic as ·Aldous Huxley but his emphasis does point to 
an e-leaent that ·is too often for,gotten in International 
Relations. 
•: 
.. _ 
..... I. . t, .· .. 
I 
r. 
It is in the light ef our beliefs 
about the ultimate nature ef reality that we. formulate our conceptions'· of 
right and wrong;· ~nd it is in the light of our conceptions of right.__ 
and wrong that we frame our conduct ••• Se far from being irrelevant, our 
aetaphysical beliefs are the finally determining faoter in all our actione.l, 
\.> 
. ; /-
\ 
The.great majority of tA~)writing in support of non- ---(! J . ' " " 
_ _j =-T:!elence in social relationahipe, non-violent resistance in 
poli tic, ..l conflict, and non-violent civilian. defence in 
1i tuations of international cenflict is'-· drawn from an 
·1nteneely religious or pacifi,t experienc@ and it is vital 
that we should be aware of what this mefP).s in terms of ite ~ 
I ) 
. ---·----~-----.. ,·--.--,,-,---·_--_-c-_--:---. --· 
Yiew of -human natqre· 'and h1111.an patentia.li ty. The pacifist, 
. ~ _j) philosopher---- the te~ is n·ot i 1ntended to exclude the man ••· 
; 
. -. Jli.ght, prefer to. be -·called an "idealist"-- believes that man 
i1 motivated by love of God and man, that human c_ol).flict can 
be resolved by the exchange ot leye a:nd the peaceful die-
-, 
p 
I 
I•., J ,., 
. ___. 
\.t, r· 
.,.,_, ... • 
' ..., 
- ,, .. :f!!!. , ·., .... .,,r,·" 
.,, 
• 
. "''. --- -~· 
. ' 
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'- .. , 
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:P•5 -D •• ' 
cueeien of differences, '"ind that thi~ loTe-in-act~Qn ahould . 
·be· ··an_d can be applied -·to international pO~·i tics• Every man · ;-
poseesees the potential for goad and··i• capable" of loving·. 
all humanity rather,than a restricted hwnan grouping. All 
individual actions are gu.ided by a unive_rea.3: _moral law which. 
· -i• as pewerful and immutable as natural law. 
. 
. There seems to be somewhat of_ a contradict1·en between 
' ·the pacifist's pelief in moral iBUD.utability and h~s belief 
in the potential of love-in-action to.change human·con.duct. 
· The pacifist aee~a Ull.decided whether man° s nature is fixed 
and the external world. is changeable, or whether both are· 
-~ 
open to change. It may be that it is only absolute pacifiaa 
0 
\ that as-8um.es the fixed nature of man. The ultimate failure 
' 
' . of pacifism to ·supply a workable key to the unlocking of 
the reasons for the existence of)conflict may derive fro• 
this aesWllption. 
'hi / 
Pacifism comes into conflict with the~ fluidi·ty of human relations. The 
~hanging nature of society 7 oempels men 
_to investigate the o~jective vml.ues of 
0 a specific war before condemp.ing it. In lifev appraisal comes before judge-aento In pacifism, the judgemeni; is .' ·.~'"' q,. a priori and concre·te appraisal· nen- -exiatent.2, 
· · 'fhe pacifiat'• c0,..itment to nen-Tielence preTent11 hl• fro• 
" -~ ~ taking cogniea.nce of what that committment may lead·to. . ' / 
' / 
/ That is to tsay ,. the pacif;,.et etresees the 11.eane. over the 
}.? ends, o~ in.more sophisticated versions saya·tha.t they- are 
essenti.ally ,inseparable. · Means are· seen as "ends-in-the-. 
' 
,. ... 
·:·" ... :p.iaking," or ''ends in process"· ~d traditio~l political. 
• 
•• ,.,.q~, 
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theory is castigated tor ecl-ipsing··-~~e&Re ~;neideratiori by 
=emphasizing concern for ends. ~ere political - theory hae · -- .--·----· ______ ...:----.- . ··-. .. 
evidenced· an awareness of ~he· unity of ends and- means, the , ..' , . 
problem has tended to be stated in term_s·- of machinery or of 
.. 
Thia scorn for a view of human nature 
which helda ·that aan is not easily open to the impact of 
love-in-action and 11ust resort t·o c·omplex and eften coerciTe 
insti tutiona to reeo·lve his diffe:r;ences reveals a patience .. 
wj.th man which, for all ite fine intentions, may be no mor• 
• 
J effective in staving off-~-hUDlan disaster than _·the 11:g.ch-derided 
aac~i~ery and devices. . It is certainly tru.e that the sort .... 
.~, 
of "consistent political realisa'1 which sees man bound .. in 
''an endless cycle of eeoial confl ·ict, ·~ where "s,,~).al cohesion 
"' ~ 
~-is impossible wi thou.t coer~cion, and coercion is impossible 
.. without the creation· of social injus.tices, and the des-
. truction ef injueticee ie impossible without the use of 
. . 4 further coerc1ontt does not have too impressive an historical 
-A•·--·'• 
rec.ord. Yet it is infinitely easier, historically,. t-0 -&chiev-e----~-
,:: this . sort of regulation of hum.an affairs which can, in s.ome 
measure,be imposed on col:lflicting interestm than it is to 
dedicate oneself, and-the rest ef humanity wh~ther i~. agrees . 
. . or not, to the painstaking duty of rationally adju.s.ting· -all. 
conflicts of right arid interest. .The pacifist st-arts frea . 
the ams~ption that all conflicts of interest are reconciliable ,. ... becauee' they are, in a-sense·, unreal~ · The philosophical 
., 
'l 
-
. . .... ' ' 
. 
.. 
. 
approac~'which has stressed that. nothing'"ie real but. ~hat is . . 
. i perceived has led to the claim. that perceptions will result 
in a change in reality~ Such a view denies the findings of ' ·; 
-~ 
. 
. . . ., 
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'p~ 1 
-phj"aical science· and., in ·the aecial and political reala,. fails . ,, ~ 
-
' 
-c~ 
. --~--·-·· t, come to _gripe with the cultural _and inetitutional strt;tcturee 
which.spawn intereste, and which cannot be removed by a. m.ere 
ch&nge in aental perceptien. · The challenge,to man is 
r 
( 
) 
r ·J·-1· 
I 
" . 
-te·aak hiaeelt whether he is er is 
not a leTer of . that -~rganized anQ. 
·durable state of affairs ca~led peace, 
aid is prepared. to adopt vJhatever _ 
seans isp in the light of experience 
and all available facts, most likely to conduce that end.5 
' t' 
Ii ia in light of thim question that the olai•s of n~n-
violence ·. and ci.vilian defence must be c0naidered. 
-
-___ ·--- , !he Ii terature of non-vielent philer,ep~y origina~~· in, : • .., 'l' • 
and is thereby concerned wi-th, inter-personal actions·· ar1d 
inter-group relations within states. Therefore-, its ability 
to tran1fer wholesale the experiences and examples of this 
•\ 
sort of non-vielent a.ction into the arena of international· 
,/' 
:politi<i>e· 11uet be closely examined. The pacifist/idealis"t'• 
be.lief that non-violent method~ will w~k in inter-state 
relatipns rests-- largely on the "geod-will principle,'' that · 
aen in .conflict need only- have their eppenent's posi tio·n .ex-
• plained to:theBJ. fer them to be willirig te engage in the 
precess._of ·.settlement which will result·in,mutual eatis-
faction. But, .more than this, the believer in non-violence .J! 
eeea international pelitics in him ,own Tery 1pecial, · way. 
He begine by claiming Martian objectivity teward the 
· conflicts of nation-atates whese function and purpot,e are 
considered obsolete. Divorced from natienali1• the pacifiat/ 
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··_·ideal:iat i• -co11mitted te. th~ attrTiT~l .of hUllmiity .. i~ preference. 
. 
. 
________ to·.:· thf s~iTal c,f arJ.Y one nation-stat~.· The C/O:rellary (?1 thia: 
. I 
that one etate. may not survive 'c, because of' the pursuit of othc,_r 
_, -geals, said_ ·to be dedicated to the au.rvival of aankind, doe• 
net-alter his adherence to ·whatever i11 left of mankind. If 
_·\·.~-
the pacifist/ideali•t rejects most political devi·cee to bring 
about "his goal (and this seems to be the rtile), he can only. 
"propose apolitical soluti0na as though they_ were tQ operate 
in a vacuum.." He is saying in effect, •• 'These proposals 
;~ •,.•, ' ~ 
' 
,' _ .. 
are •olutimn• te the war problem-- if only someene will 
· accept them. ' tt:6 The denial ef the uee of, and se:metim.ea 
even the existence of, political power condellllla the pacifiat/ 
· idealist te a life of Quixotic charges at political Qriolc 
walls. When pawer is not denied it ie because it can be claimed 
' 
. that there are two forms of power, such that the use of one 
will bring about Psira.ble ends, the use of the other, 
' . 
\ 
, ' 
. 
-·~. 
L 
undeairable ends. It is thus te be assUiled ;·that the ,f,irst 
fer.a ef pe>wer is_ a means expressing love-in-acti-&n arid wi.11 ___ .:-, 
lead unfailingly to ends of a similar nature. One would be 
hard put to discover any instanc.e ef thie fora of power in 
international politics. 
The pacifis~ and the idealist~- "er, as they aiglit b.e .. t~r 
be called, the ethical per:fectioriiets-- a.r~ apposed to the 
predominance of _t_o_rce and cempulsion in the) decision of 
I -._. '- ••~ --•-
·.international disputes, .. I. predominance -they belieYe. to be. , 
1_ ~ 
falsely rooted iri' the idea that fear is the e.trongeet &rtd 
·" b~et sanction ·for group action and association. What they· 
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. are unable to underst~d·· is that ((fear is not the only reaso~ 
., 
for the use of force, that indeed, protective love· may just _./ 
./ as surely call for its use. By assu.ming that the dominant ,_..,~ 
. 
' ' 
and underlying motivation of international politics ialf'ear · 
they are less able to· .. ·appreciate the contribution of methods 
of international control which are only 0bscurely connected 
/ with fear., - Thus, those Taluable and t:ru._sted tools of inter-
national 1ettl.eaent--- diplomatic discussion and negotiation, 
C 
arbitration and adjudication--· are neglected by the eth-ieal 
perfectioniata in favour of ill-defined methoas ef integrating 
eta.tee into a cOmmuni ty ef shared interests and universal 
concerns which beli·ee the historical neoeeei,ty of aan for 
insti tuti'enal control of him.eelf. 
0 
,, Te posit any society counting upen the spontaneous subordination of par-ticular to general interests would be· 
as gratuitous a typ@ ef speculati®,n as the Marxist 0withering=away~ d~ctrine. Con~ensus is of course essential, ·but 
am the foundatieln,---not substitute for 
-ccntror.7 -· (. ·· · 
,,. 
~he ~hiat.orical record ef the· growth and nature ef huaan ' 
·, 
•• ,•.,"-t>l. 
1eoieties does n0t allow us to share the view ef. the pacifiat/ 
·1dealist that there can texist consensus without oontrel. 
, .Al though human h·istory does contain eeme examples of societies 
whioh can in some measure.be said to have been non-vielenu, ' . . 
' . 
. - :.1 
... 
er based"· on consensus wi th.0ut control, or characterized by 
a lack of.internal and/or extern.al uee of >f.0rce, t~ese 
examples are· both exceptionall.y rttre instances of hum.an 
. 
·. ,. behavic,ur and, aore c_rucial:. for our analV,is,. se> circuaacribed ~~ ·• I t.. • - '-
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·by.historical eircllll.a~anee and peculiarity.as to be in-· 
·applicallli to modern international politica. But, in 
. ,. 
-pacifist thought, there pe:rsiets the wibounded .hope in the , . r 
potentiality of non-=violent man and, correspondingly, a 
" disregard for- historical,precedent.· ·Thie is coupled"with-
. the assertion that, . since tw~ntieth-century change im so 
unprecedented, the world cannot afford to rely on traditional 
I , 
• l 
._ 1•U-f'\t:',•,.-,J 
solutions to its new problems. "Millenni·a of experience" al'e 
~- ,. , ... " 
-. 
ne longer valid. 
. ~., 
When conditions change drastically, the :familiar, 'real1•tic' ways of be-having are almost certa-in not to work. Common sense ie u.aually the beat guide ~ in the solution of traditional problems because it contains the experience of timep and habitual approaches always 
eeem more.realistic than new ones because they have worked in th.e past. But unprecedented problems require 
unprecedented solution0, ·and th.e 
correct one is likely to app~ar bizar~e 
or ridiculous. simply because it is eo 
unfamiliar • • • • 8 ill>-
, 
,,,. . 
,. 
!his is·- 1-ntende4. to be an ·argµment gainet the continuing 
acceptance e>f war as a, method for a,et ling di,eputea between 
. 
.. statea but it can also be turned the other way when we 
re-alize th~t act3 and theories of non~violence and paaeiTe 
--- - ( . . . -
resistance are at leaa·t as old. aa acts and theor,ies ~-
----·~--· violence but have not been endowed with. the eucceas that 
human ao.ciety demands of its methods of action. Indeed tne 
-----
.• _,1 · .JI:. 
·' 
- • 
·1 • same argumen-t of disdain for~ .. history might· be uee~ to· support 
. 
> the-- unique case of -graduated 'nuclear deterrence as the prime~ . 
:·mean1, for guaranteeillg international peace and a,tability, in·· . ' 
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· th.e twentieth century, whether through. 1 ta_ own ·deTioea or· 
- ; . / 
. :: .·'· .-,•.. .' 
... _ ... _ . \. 
' ... -.-, . ·;. -··' ...... -.(· '--· .. --- --~ ~·-··- . th.rough encouraging ·serious .arms control. . 
. ' . 
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We come, once again, to a difference over e~da-and meana.· · 
The ethical perfectionist 11 searching for·a means·that ·will 
bring about a permanent aolti.tion of a P.roblem, a perfect end. 
He argues, therefore, that.the stability of nuclear deterrence, 
or the efficiency of war as an arbiter of international conflict, 
er the organization of societies on a foundation of con119~l 
control, cannot be regarded as valid long-term resolution• of 
..... 
the problems. Since, he' argues, man is at the root of all--- . 
hi1 inetitutions, it i• to man and hie motivations that we 
have to go to find the Teal 1olution which will be produced 
' by "'an extension of aocial intelligence and an increase in 
moral goodwill.fig Thia. search for permanent solutions aeelll• 
te ignore ·two things._ First,. few, if any, eolutiona to 
poli tioal problems have eve--r been permanent and those that 
l 
~- -··· haTe are preserved by legal and thereby coercive eanctiona. <f 
I' ~. 
. ,. 
:.,· I 
~·. 
·secondly, moat problems seem to have a., limited impact on man 
' (or, al !~aet, - that man sees· them as having'" limited impact) 
and that, therefore, limited or temporary eolutions will be 1 ' \ . ~· .. 
{: . 
acceptable to him.. It is perhaps this ... tranai tory, imperm~~nt 
;-~ 
' 
, . 
view of himself that enables man to be satisfied with non-·, 
·. rad.ical solut·ions. · This view would seem to be reinforce<f.! .. in 
~ 
· .. international peli tica by two aepects of.· twentieth-century .· ' 
\ ' 
I § 
fl 
,;* 
"! 
fi 
1:! 
society-. First, the ·interest in foreign affairs, though,,.growing, . _,: I 
~:.-----~ I ia still largely .. of an uninf ornied sort and remains restricted . --~ .. ..) \ 
, :~ 
f!:' 
'[~! 
·, 
,,1 
:i ii 
. ' ~~ 
·.to p.olicy-formulating elites, and· second, the impersonality 
ef modern ma\,• society doe• not· encourage , long-term commitment 
--
,.· 
..·, - - ' 
...... 
,', . 
./ ..... 
'· 
,,•w••''""''"'"""''°''W\ 
c,,. ....... , 
'-:..·.: .. ~,-
_· ... ,l .. , .. " 
·, 
....... . . . 
' , 
/'' 
, • '41 
' . ' 
., . 
. ' . 
. ~,.. . L . : 
. -~ P• 12 . 
'"' 
- •• -- ' ' I • 
J' 
···-·· 
\ 
J • 
t·o, non-violent action on _the ··individual level, ,.desir_o_us_~ 
. )'! ' . "' . 
i 
• 
0
,, •• though this· would be for. ridding society of its impersonality~ 
It would appear that, in a very· real eense, ·it is more "rea1·;·n 
even more ''radical," to taekle .institutions, not man himself •. 
. 
In any case, 1_:t can surely be agreed that the ·two are no·t, 
mutually exclusive -in any rigid sense.-
,· 
It .seems to be with this spirit. in mind that the ad-
.. 
vocates of civilian defence. present ... a-method aimed far more 
-
at institutional change than that of any previous non-vio.;Lent 
theoristE) They ·sugg~st. concrete ways of applying non-violence~ 
to the structure of the nation-state. 
I 
Befo_:re conside,ring the details of -..civilian defence, we 
d 
· must look at the relevant ethical aspects of· the nation-state 
, ~ . 
and 'its political. environment. The ethics of state action and 
the moral dilemmas of statemen must be faced- ~quarely by 
ethical perfe,btionists •. The· justification for war lies in ~ 
the preservation of some men rather than others, this pre- · 
servation being a duty delegated.to the leaders of each state • 
. fhe leader is responsible for· avoiding the ~a.f sastrous sacrifice 
- ..., 
, 
of his charges and, traditionally, fa~ed by the/choice between 
committing mass killing in the .name of the state and of 
"~' ., 
sacrificing his, own state to the ravages of anotp.er, chooses 
the first option. ;(Often, of cour8e, either action may-· have 
the same result.) To the ethical perfect·ionist, this is pre--y 
ii ,.. 
eminently a moral dilemma. 
The leaders of the state may have to. 
choose between behaving · immorally in . ,. 
international ·politics in order to pr(;!-.: - ! 
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·serve· the state, on the O!l-8 hand,· 
· and on the other, · abandoning their 
moral· .obligation to ensure their 
· state.O?,s. survival in order to follow 
. 'preferred ways ·of acting in·· inter- . 
nati·onal politics o o o . o ._Moral . · 
' ! 
behavior is one thing in a system 
-that provides predictable amounts 
and types of security; another 
.:.. ,~:- ' 
thing wnere such security.is lacking.10 
l . -
. '. 
Without examining all the ethical facets of the statsman •·a 
choice we must observe the full_implicatiori of the ethical 
,. pe·rfectionist's recommendation in this dilemma. Refusing to 
justify as· act (say, a de.claration of war) that will- i·ead to 
kil·ling and thereby confound the absolute ethic of lov·e, and 
.,., . 
refusing .. ··to accept the argument that the circumstarices of 
internati9~al politics do not allow the ethic to operate, 
· , ~the ethical perfectionist can of:fer no advice to statesmen :. 
0 
', 
· other than to give up public office and turn their backs on 
politics.'''11 If, on the oth-erhand,we can "start with the 
conviction that -there can be no escape from sacrifices of 
value" we can " 
---·· ··--···.- .·· 1.-·· 
;· . 
hold that men, statesmen and private individuals,, alike, are morrally require.d . . ' /; to choose among the roads open ···to them 
, the one which under the circumstances promises to produce the least. destruction·. 
. of value or, positively speaking, points .,. toward the maximizati.on of value.12_ 
The non-v10·1-ent theorist blocks the one road down which, 
historically, the statesman has been ab.le to turn in the. 
j___ 
'{, 
· last resort-..:~,~he use of military force. · The advocate of 
civilian defence must, therefore, be able to demonstrate 
1¥'"·''" 
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first why this option should. s·erve as its· substitute._ 
.. \ 
. 't-i. ~ · ---~iviliall defence challenges not just the historical ·styl_~ of · > 
--
. interstate relations, or the determi~tion of methods of waging 
. 
. . 
-- . ·:,.war, it also challenges. the conventional meaning of deterrence 
' 
':.•. 
theory and -.its system of threa*S and promises, rewards and · 
punishments,. a system i;n· which the ability to threaten and 
use coercive military f Qrce plays · a cruc'ial part. 
The advocates of non-violence·arid of civilian national 
.. d~fence opposes the conventional reality of international 
,, 
poli t·ics. ~t many .points-- and these will be discussed at length 
in succeeding sections-- but he does so very often because/·of 
a·fundamental dive~gence from the conventional philosophical 
assumptions of statesmen .and political commentators. Where 
this divergence shapes the subse·quent- divergence in prescrip--
tion for action in international politics we should be aware 
'Of ·1 t; · where metaphysical beliefs do not intru.de in any over-
powering fashion it is easier to treat the prescriptions on 
their relative 8J}.alytical and structural merits. Indeed, much. · 
of the more recent writing on civilian defenc·e has tried. -to 
. ) exclude ever-present consciousness of its philosophical roots. 
But, whatever his ,starting point,· the non-violent theorist must 
: ·} 
face Perry's question: is he or is he not a lover ef "that 
organized and durable· state of affairs called peace • • -.----·--·-·--. ·-, -
(such that·he)- is prepared to adopt whatever· means is. 
• • ,,:_;; ' 
most likely to conduce that end"?13 
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' · ·. : "What is 'Civii,ian ·Defence? 
. 
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- · To avoid the possibility ·of confus-ion_: over·· a definition 
. of c,i vi.lian q~if ence, it seems appropriate to first record the · ·. 
"'official". defini tiori of civilian defence theorists themselves.; -~- .• ·---i--~ • -~ 
Civilian defence is . 0 . 
-----. 
,a policy- for the preservation ofa 
society's freedom against .passible 
· internal threats (as coup d'etat) or 
external threats (as inv~sion) by advance 
-preparations to resist such usurpation by action of·the civilian population. The sanction relied upon· to deter such 
attempts or to defeat them in· emergencies · is the technique of non=violent. ac_tion, aimed not simply at altering the will 
of the usurper but at making it impos-
sible by both massive and selective 
non-cooperation and defiance of the 
citizens· f·or the usurper to estab·lish 
and/or maintain his control o o " • In contrast.with certain types of pacifism, a· ·civ1·11an defence ·J:'Olicy involves power 9 both in the application 
of power through the technique of non-violent action against the usurper 9 _and in the ~egulation of the usurper 0 s power by controlling the availability 
of the sources of his power which are in such a case intimately associated 
with the degree of eo=opera~ion~ consent and obedience provided by his ovm 
subjects~ his agents of administration 
and repression, and by the civilians of the society he is attempting to control.l 
' .,, .'. 
• w 
A • 
;. ... 
I-t can readily be seen th~t civilian defence is desi·gned 
,,; \ 
to confront· not evade the issues of conflict, violence, and 
I 
·power •. 
.J 
It is based on a recognitiQ~ that 
conflict in international affairs is, inevitable; it draws:_'·~-on a considerable body of historical experi~e; and it 
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effers a distinctive approach··'to the 
control ·of political and mili_tary 
·p~wer.2 
- ·--:-:--:: -- --·· 'i''. - ' -~-----· 
I 
~n 1928,~--in .. ~ seminal essay, Walter Lippmann stre·ssed 
'that ''any real;·_programme of ·peace must rest on 1 the premise ;) 
that there will be causes of dispute.as_~ong as we can foresee, ' 
that these disputes have to be decided, and that a way ef 
deciding them must be found which is not war."3 Accepting "' 
the inevi tab·111 ty of social and·- pa,li ti cal conflict civilian 
defence proponents go on to argue that this very inevitability~ 
mak:~s it "desirable and pe>ssible to reduce the number of 
··conflicts, influence their means of expression, the type · of' 
· sanctions used, and assist in their resolution. ,,4 · The mi ti-. 
gation of the destructive effects of conflict .is a pr·ime pur-
pose 'of eivilian defence. Roberts' assertion that civiliall 
',, 
qefence i·s-. solidly grounded ir1 hist~rical experience is .. 
highly ques··ti.onable, notwithstand;i.ng Gene Sharp's .compilation 
· of 84 cases of non-violentaction.5 It is _open to question 
(and will be questioned ~ere thoroughly below) primarily 
beca~,ae none of the 
attempted.ta defend 
-:.;, ~ 
cases is one where a nati~te has 
'-._r·,.. 
. . itself against"inv~sion. The connection 
between the list of cases· and civilian defence is not a 
>' direct one and any such connection between-different political 
events cannot. b~ accepted without greater demonstration of i,ts · 
· -main logical threads. The history of non-violent doctrine and-
0 
' 
j ' 
'- J :--
- action may be ancient and historically tes-ted but c·ivilian 
defence cannot auto~at:fcally assume this experience as proof 
,, 
of its own possi~ili ty of operation and probability of ~ 
.success. 
,r. -,., ·' 
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The concept of .Power 'i'nay seem .nebulous to p'litical 
. •, 'i" 
¢ 
.. 
,~.~.cientists but.its. application in' the real worlQ; is·. suff~oiently_· ' 
. . 
· concrete ·to evoke real react·ions. In th&.twentieth century 
":the wielding of poli ti.cal power by· a ruler involves· the· 
ability to direct the behav,i.or of other people, to draw on._ 
large resources (human and material), to· wield __ an apparatus 
of ooerci,on, and· to direct a bu,reaucraoy to administer his 
.· policies. 116 If this ru.ler were to De a foreign invader it 
is civilian.defence's claim that it could so confound his 
ability-to carry·out these functions that he would decide 
at the least to ameliorate the conditions of his occupation, 
8.lJ.d at the best would find it too much of a political and 
-~ II ·t "' 
· financial,_ embarrassment to justify i.ts continuation. This ~ -~ .. ., 
\ 
claim begins by emphasing the two-sided relationship between 
the ruler and the governed, the occupie·r and the occupie.d: 
"the ruler's power is ••• not a 'given' static factor but 
( varies with the degree of ac·_quiescence and consens~s of the 
governed.n 7 --If means can be found ta deny the ruler the 
de._gree of acquiescence and consensus necessary to c0mf,ortable 
or efficient government his rule can· be thwarted. The 
.. --·---~---
s geve~ed, in a civilian defence, wi·ll "refuse to perform acts 
.~,· .,; 
' . 
which they usually perform, are expected 'by custom.to perform, 
or are req-µired by law a.Ild regu.lation to perform;" and they 
will also "perform acts which they usually do not perform,_--
·¥ 
are not_ expected by custom to pe-rform, or are-forbidde:Q. by 
lwa or regulation from performing."8 (The form.er are called 
acts of omission,~ the ,latter acts of commission.} This 
,· 
. ' 
:.... '\' \ 
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:·' ' "!'-,.r. •, . :method of defence is coinmit-ted. tt> ab.stain from any use of ' 
'·',!{ . 
,,, ' . . 
.. 
., .......... . 
,... physical violence, but -i-s '';d~signed to .1oper.ate against 
----;- --- --~:-'; ' - . (:'; . /d . . . . . 
•. 
-··---~~:-
·"'· 
:u;. 
I-'-, . • 
...... ,.. .,. ..... 
, . 
. -:::;:::.·' . 
·· ·" opponents with the capa~i ty for,· .and the willingriess to, · 
apply vi9lence to attain their· objecti ves.119 
Th~ efficacy of· civ~lian d.efence in resisting -an in-
vader or. confounding as ocoupi·er is perh~p·s · easier to accept 
.I 
,; that its efficacy in pres·erving the t;erri torial integrity. of 
.·a state ... and in deterring attack. Advocates of the method 
begin by acknowledging that ·it '' cannot def end geographical 
borders or · territorial i~tegri ty as suchtt and by asserti.ng 
that "'as a rule neither can the military establishment. 1tl.O 
This assert~on is so general that it is very hard to see 
e~actly where it might be applica~le~. Some · defence esta-blish-. 
ments have preserved territorial integrity-- Britain, the 
• I ' U.S.A., and Portugal, for in~ta.noe, have not had invading 
··~ ~ •· I I/ 
11 troops on'~heir soil this century-- but this conventional 
concept of integrity has ~een to some extent modified by the 
development of aircraft and missiles. In any case, military 
defence does not oµerate in a vacuum. It relies for its l 
--
,,.,, 
t"'·,j"':f'..:·-: 
success O'r failure on facto-r-a of geography and diplomatj.e skill, 
'-=-~. 
and also, as -t-.i:a the cases of Sweden-and SwitzerJand in the 
1939-1945 war, on the acceptance of a ~radi ti.on of neutrality. 
r.. 1-ll'>j.-"rl'I• 
. . .. , ..... - """ .... 
However, the point is taken that, in m~t par·ts of .the world, 
a conventional war _will as likely gestroy your state ~s 
your opp.on.ent' a .• 1(/ This is especially true in. the case of 
· ·, small states (except Israe1·1) using military methods of 
··. ~ 
·defence and acting on their own such that .. ,tthey rely_ upon the 
> ' 
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very sa:notions arid mes.ha .of· s·ti-uggle ·which they are least. 
. " 
. equipped to wield a~d·· which the · regimes mos·t seriously. . 
'. ' ' 
· threateIJ.ing 'their freedom are most· capable of using. tt11 
C'ivilian defence methods ·in small states will be examined in 
.. 
detail belew~. 
. . 
In the area of nuclear . warfare, civilian defence and 
' 
·-· 
military defenee are likely .to prove. equally useless for a· 
·state not possessing nuclear.weapons, but there are two 
· reasons why civilian defence might possibly prove more valuable 
than a conventional form.of military defence. First, a state 
i ' .... 
' 
. 
. w1 thout weapons of any sort lacks .the capac.i ty to provoke war--
. 
certainly the attacker would have to argue very persuasively 
to produce a case of moral justification; and second, 1 
.. 
civilian defence is more readily geared to the protection 
•••"""'"'"""""":t;~..:... 
_,-, • 
. ·and supp:ort of. the population since it invo·lves ~.all ci tize~s 
... in their own defence and specifically provides for the stock.: 
piling of food, ·fuel, /an.d emergency sup.plies. Indeed, these 
~-
two points are cornerstone ·of ,civilian defence as a deterrent. 
It endeavours to avoid any policies likely to, provoke· an-
tagonism and threats of, or thoughts of, invasion; further, 
~ ~ ' to make a prospecti. ve invader aware of the difficulty h@; %, • • 
·\ 
::\ wiJ.l have in eccupying the st~te thus m~king him less likely 
to carry e>~-~-~is intention. Since the objective of invasion 
... 
~- --~--is usually some degree of success in harnessing the pro-.-
ductive resources of land and population the denial of them 
.,. 
,< 
will force the invader to -calculate the value of the target 
' 
·, 
· ,state in terms of the need· to use his o~ manpower and 
,! ', 
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~-
. 
. 
. resources, . and of the ~train imposed on his p,oiitical con-
. 
. 
. 
trol in hi.s. own state and in 1the occupied state.' The 
~ devotion· of the entire resources of. the Czechoslovak state··· 
. ' -
. ,---;: .. , ~ ·. :.-:; . . :·--. 
... 
to a prepared· civ-ili8Jl. defence in 1968 'could ·have made the . 
Warsaw Pact invasion even more internati o~ally· ·embarras_sing 
than it was and, more important, it could have kept the. in-
vaders embroiled there in a long, arduous and expensive 
occupa ti on • 
One further introductory note· must be inserted: 
line of the process of· adopting a civilian defence. 
an out-
In line 
with other programs for-graduated unilateral military disen-
gagement, civilian defenc.e would be ":a complex process spread 
over a considerable period of time. n 12 This is so for both 
physical and psychological reasons. The pop~lation has ~o - --··" 
be trained in 1 ts new technique o·f. defence, the military 
establishment has to be dismantled, long-term planning has 
--· 
. to be done. 
If one takes away the only means of defence a person believes to be truly 
effectivep he certainly has every 
reason to feel frustrated. Thus, a 
. reduction of reliance on th.e military · 
must be preceded by 'the development 
of increased confidence in and gradual 
· adoption of al terna ti ve means of de- -~ fence.' nl3 p 
9ide · by aide with the process of. int·ernal 11 transarmam.ent'1 -·--
·the adoption of a civilian .. and. the abandonment ·of a mili ta:cy 
defence~~ would go a policy of .educating and .informing other 
states·· of- the intentions .of the transarming state_,. and of 
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. giving them progress reports at, each .stage. ·.The tem·porgry · 
. . - . 
" 
,, 
co-existence-- temporary fo.r. one assumes that a decision· 
' 
. , would have to be· made ·one way or t~e other-- of a partial 
' 
military. and a part:L al civilian defence syetem would create 
some confusion in strategic deployment and like any other 
. 
. 
major policy change (decimalization or nationalization, for 
example), would impose ~ EUmost double financial burden on · 
· the state. The strategic confusion is an external problem, 1 
" the effects of which would have to be minimi·zed. It would, 
therefore, be important to ma.ke ''the initial series · of unilateral 
acts"'. cumulative in their tension-reducing effect upon otJ;ler, 
states bµt\non-cumulative in their effect on the trarisarming 
-· ,"s.;o \ . 
. sta:fe•~ capability to deter and defend.14 
-~- ~ . r· ~ There ·are innumerable differences of- Opinion among 
civilian defence theorists on many of the above points, and 
on other proble~s such ~s the structure and form of the 
,, . 
- defence organization, the size and character _of any internal 
police force, the co-ope·rati on of non-goverlllile:µ.tal insti-
l 
-----· .. · .· 
,-::-· -tutions, and so on. (These will all be ex~ined in detail in 
·. 
later sections.) Though civilian defence may have its roots 
.:i:p. .. Utopian non-violence, it 
has ~ot been developed as a policy 
for a future Utopia. It is based on 
the premise that defense today, if .. 1i t 
· is to be real and not simply dest~btive, 
must be self~defenseo Lasting and , -~., 
genuine freedom depends upon intern.al>· c~i--:-::-: 
strength and the capacity of the 
c-i tizens to defend it against all -·: ; . : ; .· .. :.. ..;.~;;, ·. ,,.. ' . ·.,.' -,-.·· . , .... 
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-The· adoption of civilian. defenc~ by a state would ~e-
present a fundaJllen~al change. in government p·olioy. Like any . 
~ 
. _other major government· decision the full ramifications· of its 
impact on. the social and political structure of the state· ' l 
. __ .. 
might b.e only poorly. u;i.derstood, but its impact wo-qld never-
theless be profound. Alterations to both governmental and -
non;;.governmental stru.ctu±es would occur •... 
. '..(' 
THE LEGITI1~C-Y ··oF> GOVERNliIENT 
., . 
Centuries of debate have produced no· single th_eeey--~-
~ 
establishing the legitimacy of the power of government. 1 
Government is said~ variously, to derive its legitimacy frmm 
the direction .and support of one or more· gods, from the 
.. , 
support of one .. or more classes, forom the support of all men 
' ~- ~ 
• '- 7· 
\ 
.. ' . . 
.. ,., ......... ,;., .. ti.~·-
llllder its ju.risdicti on, or f!'Om the support of a· preponderance 
of ~he armed forces existing vvithin the boundaries of the 
state. It would be both difficul.t and misl·eading to ·attempt 
~/- to determine' wnich of these sources of legitimacy is or,. .. ·· ... 
--:r could., be universally true,. rt· is only marginally less 
difficult to try to determine which source or combination 
. ,, 
of sources has been responsible for a single goverrunent. 
Tp.e prooI-em is compounded if __ the single go,vernment we are 
considering has never existed,. and does p.ot now exist: 
there ,has never been a state geared to a policy of .civilian ._, i ; 
-
. ..,. :• 
defence and so, in ·the fo.llowing discussion, we have to; 
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assume a government and- a state being subjected t-0 the q 
' 
. 
' 
·adoption-of such a· policy. The assumed structur-es it will . • I 
be· mo-at fruitful. to work with will be structurei, of a· loose 
and composite nature. Under the, -guise of exploring the 
'itttpact of civilian de,fence on ~ .single government structure 
. .,. . 
we will consider its impact on many parts. of a.11 possible 
. governments .• 
\....-• 
. ... 
. -. ·,-- . 
&overnment can be, and often ls, based on and legitimized. 
\_~Y possession of ·t_h_~---p~eponderance of . coercive power within 
.. . 
the state. This coercive power has usually taken. th.e form 
of both internally-direc~1e·d Eµid · e~terllally-directed armed 
fore es, ~l;l.a t,· is, ·o:e :Qolice and army. If it is 
. . . 1 . 
"in all social conflicts .vi~ienc~is the argument of the 
last resort, "2 the removal of the government's means of coer- ·. 
ci~n would result in the disintegration of the state. The 
extent of this disintegration· wo.uld be considerable where 
. . 
. . 
· the state 'a capacity for viol·ent coercion, either internal 
or ext_ernal, 
. . 
..: 
. is an underlying, tacit, recognized, 
and omnipresent fact of domestic life. It is the fact that instills dynamism to the structure and growth of the law, ·the settlement of disputes, the . processes of accomodating interests, 
and that induces general ~aspect for the verdict of the polls. . ~ 
' ,I~ •• 
• • • 
1'·· \'' 
· Obedi·ence to the gove1rnment does not have t~o be extradted 
from the _ ci tiz·ens by force bµt such a government • 
. \ "iS. 
. . 
not ·base'd on 'naked force ·can function 
only -if certain· beliefs are ·a~cepte·d by the 
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overwhelming maj ori-ty" .: of' the 'population; ' 
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I •. 
·-- '-- ·, ' - . -~. - ' ' ~,, .. . "' - . - . . _.. - ' ~ .· : 
if there is an agreement on, the right 
to commanjt and tbs·· duty to obey. · If 
such agreement does· not. exist " ·• • · 
naked force must remain the agrument 
' 0 
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~ ' : "' . 
,of the last resort, and the distri-
bution .-of mil-i ta~y, __ ~ight the" principal 
determinant of social structure.4 
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This is not, of e·our.se,\ the only possible foundati. on of .. 
' -
· government but, evdn in ,the most quiescent states. i~ has 
: .,., 
·, 
.. 
always been ~ foundation· •. · C;yilian- defence contemplates the 
total eradication of this foundation. We mu.st investigate 
the c·onsequences of this action arid, as far as possible, 
evalu~te the probable effects it will have upon the 
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THE COERCIVE POWERS OF THE GOVERNMENT 
-
The impact of the period of ·.transarfuament and the 
eventual adoption of a civilian de~ence will be felt most 
. ~ -
·. . ' 
severly by the coercive elements of the ,governnen-t-al structure 
~ \,, ;.,' I • 
' ' 
~hich are being superseded by tb.e new defensive system. 
" Transarmament will invo+ve_ the destru~tion of all armaments, 
both private and·· "state-controlled. - It wi·11 also disturb 
!')> 
the status and structure of the arme~ ·fore-es and the police, 
" 
perhaps to the extent of total disabandomnent and.redeployment. 
"' 
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Armaments-- Destruction arid Inspection 
It has been argued that civilian defence .. doe·s not en-
· tail disarmament since conventi~nal weapons are being replaced'*' 
.. ,,1 • 
'by those "of a- different kind, 115 and. a;~so be~~U.se trans-,. 
. . ~ ' 
armament, ·unlike di-s·armament, does r1-ot 1irivolve "'sudden· and 
total change. n5a On the first point, it is semantic irres-
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. r pyschologioal meaning so that,- de-s-t~otive Md :r;i.on-de.stru.otive-.,,c .-·~-~--c.-~~-: ·~ ·[ . . . 
. . b 
t. 
violent and non-violent weapons can be regarded a·s instruments 
~-............. . ... , .. 
designed for the sam~ end. The acknc;,wledgment that civilian· 
defence merely use~ weapons nof a dif'~erent kind" give~·no 
. 
. . 
__ indication of the qualitative and.quantitative differences· 
. between-the unas_sisted .human body and the exter1sions of 
human coercive capability that man has ·created for·:himself. 
-On the- second point, we should not be sucyrized to·notice the 
\ 
~: 
common b-u-t erroneous view o.f disarmament as a swift and abrupt 
.. ·-:r 
process. Disarmament possesses many problems arising solely 
_ _j':rol!!__ the physical des true ti on· of -armaments-- the time it would _________ _ 
requir·e to collect and dismantle arms, the allocation of human, 
mechanical and financial resources to the destruction of them, 
. 
and the· inter-rel~ted problems of evasion and· inspection. 
~here are few disarmament experts who would expect the 
. process o-Y aisarming a state ·to- be "sudden." ~at it would 
be 0 total" is a matter of policy not feasibility and, assuming 
that·other states could refrain from exploiting the disarmed 
.state, there is no reason why· t·otal national disarmament could 
I • 
• ,,-
· not take place over a reasonable period of time. It has been· 
estimated-- more on intui·tive grounds tha.Ii any other, one 
suspects-- that transarmament would proceed by stages. over a ---
long period of time, b' possibly lasting ten years. 7 · .. The · 
\ 
length of this process is not determined by any difficulties 
_ ..... A .. -J.!1_ .... ~he physical destruction of· armaments, nor by any compli-
cations in sett~ng up .a system of supervision, inspection, 
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. and o-ompliance for transarmament. i , ·• I:t --is · determined by the .. _· . 
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· ·.. -~ logical adjustment so that no permanent scars· are ~eft on ~ 
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1 individuals or on society as a whole. 
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'!he Armed Forces 
- - -~-·---···- \ , .. , ... -~ ... More· than any other gr-oup in the state the personnel of 
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the armed· forc·es would. suffer incursiorts into ·their public 
and their(R~:s<?nEll liVes_from the change of policy. At 
first sight-~ massive scale of manpower redeployment 
would seem to impose an. intolerable burden -on the economi_es 
of either capital-intensive, industrial states or labour-
intensive, pre-industrial states. --But it has been shown in 
the past that economies are capable of absorbing the extra 
manpower· generated by natural incre·~se, however clumsily and 
I 
h~rshly th~s may sometimes have been accomplished_. In 
addition, the infusion·of military manpower into the civilian 
economy would enrich the level o·f ·· skilled labour and manage-
ment. 
. - ·- -··:· . ...- .. 
" ' 
~-- . 
There · are skills required in modern · 
military structures that are capable of being used for non-military purposes, 
skills that in some areas of the world 
are in short supplyo To be found in 
military forces today are individuals 
ar1d un.i ts skilled i11 .engineeringp 
medicine, communications, tr~nsportat-ion, .. ~- ·· ·. procurement and distribu-tion techniques,· 
and adult training and education.a . 
. Re·dundant military men would have .to be fitted in.to the· 
'J. 
( 
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,.•···: 
e '·.. ··state' s economic sy:stem with minimal disturbance to that system. 
In the next section we will discuss some of the grave problems I 
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· : ·-rising from the Elisma:p.tling of an econ~my geared for war. · .. 
, , , "' , ... ·· ·····-.;; However gr~duaLand smooth 1;)le period of transarmai:o.ent . ··;·< · < ' 
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. "is, the tnili tary. man will suffer severe. blows to his style· 
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. of life and to his ethical -system. . Aside ./from the need to 
,., 
. 
. 
r" find · a new c.areer-- even if he can be used in ci viliaii defence 
it will not be the sanie to him--- he will find it hard to accept 
the mobilization of the-majori tZ of the civilia.,n population, 
i 
to conquer his fear that _civilian defence puts his country 
,\ 
\· 'UDD.ecessarily at the mercy of its enemies, and to overcome 
. •·~ .... 
''---.__ his hankering for a reversal of transarmament. He may feel 
~ ~ 
deprived of purpose, a member of a displaced soctal group • 
. 
All the symptoms· of withdrawal, ; bitterness, and resentme11t 
' 
.. presently experienced by other dying breeds, such as· skilled 
_, 
-- artisans I and craftsmen, will belong . to military men.. The 
difference between artisans and craftsmen and thEr military 
' lies in·the latter's knowledge of and, during·transarmament, 
possessi·on of ·armaments. It would be both natural and easy 
for a section of the military to contemplate and ~perate 
resistance to the institution of civilian defence. Since the 
majority of---the armed fore es would have agreed initially .. to 
the replacement of military defence the res_isting gro-µ.p · 
" .... 
would be either one which had be.en opposed to· civilian 
' ( defence from the start butt had been ove.rru.led,,.,or one v,hich' ·· 1 
. had come ·t·e-- believe that the whole concept, or. a .Particular 
. ~ 
application of ciyilain defence, wass too d.a.ngerous. :for the 
\ 
s~curi ty. of t~.~._ state. That this is a distinct probabil~ ty._ 
. --- -, . i 
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J 
im. a transarming state may·be illustrated by examples_of· twentieth· 
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· century governme~ts 1attempting onJ.y 'to reduce the ·arm.8Jllen:ts 
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. -- It ·seems p·robable that Mr.- ·Krushchev'·s. 
efforts to.reduce Russia's army were frustrated by the military and their political allies; this reaction is 
·-~·· '." - . 
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. liable to ®ccu·r _vdth varying. violence 
.in almost ahy country where an arms , 
cut is projected o o o o Among the developing countries 9 the Shah of Iran 
-contemplated an arms cut. but found the 
course too dangerouso Several African leaders 9 lncluding President J\Tyerere, have expressed the heartfelt wish to· , be able to dispense with armed forces 
altogether 9 but they have never felt 
strong enough to ,.go through with it. 
Probably they were wise; for when 
Presiden~ Sylvanus Olympio of th.a T.ogo Republic tried to set a limit 
to the size of his arm.y.9 he was 
assassinate~. The same thing might happen to any ruler of a developing. 
country who tried a to~_ abrupt cut ~ in arms.'j · , . 
t • 
)'!'' 
·, . 
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In· .a politically developed state with a cl ear tradition. of · ~ 
-t. 
civilian control over t~e military such a threat during 
/,; 
transarmament is of· a lower order of probabili ty,;1but, in the 
V 
light of the relatively·· unknown· conditions arising from 
. ~ 
. . 
transarmament, it cannot be regarded as. beyond·--=probabili ty. -¥ 
A military coup d'etat during transarmament woul·d demonstrate . , 
. dramatically that. the pol·i tical conditions for a change in 
, · the national defence system had not been reach~d, and that 
-
. the decision to, .adopt civ~li.an d.efence had been premature. 
The success or .failure· o:f the coup under these circumstances ' 
~· "· ' ·· ·· ·, would p~;haps be. immaterial for the attempt itself would · show 
. 
. 
that the government had failed t-o perform its ~unction of ··' 
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.• persuad.4.-ng·--all-,,-i ts subjects of the value of· civilian defenc.e, I 
\ . t> . 
··v.,,· 
I 
I 
J 
. . . 
.. 
··~.--
..... ~ ' • C 
·, . 
'. .· .,, .. \ 
t·' 
. 2 / 
· .~ ... :.:ip .-.. -, 9 /. 
I . . . . . . . 
. 
. . I 
.... ·. and 1 ts function of prE!servirtg. the state from both 'internal: / .. I ·: • • ' • 
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I :~- · .. and external coerci.on. This l~st charge would be most telling. 
. 
. . 
. I : 
J, ) 
, ·. since_ the co~cept of civil.ian defence has largely evolved//from 
' , 
.. ·~- . histori cal examp.les of non-violent resistance to coups d' e~at. 
. T~e·resistance of a disgruntled military to the adoption 
' of civ~lian defence would not nece$sarily have to take }the . , ,. . , 
. I . . / 
.. 'form~ o::f a c-oup d 'e.tat. In . conju.nctl..on with other groups the · 
;military could delay.and confuse the implementation of the 1
· 
new defensive structure so as ·to undermine its worth in the ' 
-eyes of the public. Or, it could exert political pres.sure 
. . on the government more directly with th.e intention of either 
t'orcing a change in policy, a change in the co.mposi tion of 
• .. l • 
. . . 
'.. . 
. . . . 
-·the government,· or a change of government. These objectio:p.s 
to oi,vilian de·fence may be considered cynical ~nd unneces~sarily 
suspicious for_ i-t· would und_o}lPtedly be unlikely (and f,oo~ish) 
. ,. of a government to adopt civilian defence when there wasYh_e 
' 
, . r~motest. possibility of serious political .controversy, let .,· 
alone a coup d'etat. 
.. ~ . 
. '··-~· 
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. . Those countries which are most likely to adopt a policy of civilian defence are perhaps the least likely to suffer a 
.cou:g £ '.etat_. Free associations and insti tuti. ons,· and a strong sense of social 
~(tohes-ion, are fact.ors which 11 even with-out a_p·repared resistance strategy, help.-t;q_protect a society against control by a minority.10 
• f •........... But,. theorists of civilian defence ·.·are sufficiently realistic 
,. 
. "~·.\:--. ·-···· ,. ! 
', ·\~ to acknowledge that ev~n under quasi-ideal condi t:iona the 
period of transarmament is especially vulnerable to 
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. disruption, and -that the' ',l~qu~d~tion 
· fraught with difficulties_ • 
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· The Police and the Social Ord 
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the· armed forces · is . 
' . . 
..... 
' ' ' 
. 
,{ . , . . 
" 
.·. The disarming. of· the ,military may have only .1.imi ted 
. ,//" 
impact upon the interlla:t· structuring of the state so long as 
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. :.. : ~ . . . ·~, . 
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the lat.ter retains the coercive powers of a police force. The 
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I'· 
function of~. these powers ./ . 
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is to maintain a threshold of force t~ t deters·· or contains latent an ti-
·. social acts of individuals and groups. Some element of personal dislocation 
· and anomie exists in the best man~ged -····~ .. , 
and most equi"table sccie·ties,, Even 
when isolated· outbreaks eontai·n germs 
of larger social issue·s, they may be· 
contained at acceptab~e.costs by the 
. measured application of appropriate police power.11 
·I 
,Advocates of civilian defence are not in agreement ovfr the 11. , 
""...: 
._./ 
· s.tatus ;or func,ti ons of the police force.·- Some see the. 
I 
I 
aboli ti.on of a polfu force in a society purged of any urge 
,· to com.mi t crimes;· others urge the retention of the police 
., .. 
~.(\ force but insist that it be disarmed, thoug:h ·they do not 
. .. ,n, . 
seem to specify the extent of disarmament---.(is a truncheon ""~-~-
. 
·.·.-··· ...... _· an armament?),; and again, othe~s favour an armed police force 
,.,,,,' ,.,, ,:,,,,· '' '; 
whose operation is to be tightly circumscribed by the 
' . 
~. society at large. 
The precondition for the first two proposals is a 
fundamental change in the social and political structure of 
, the state. This change is os·all-encompassing-as to-·alter 
' 
~ 
· the entire o.oncept of the nation-state. I,n~eed, "the war-
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_ -··making, s,overeigri n~tion-State of modern times· could have ·no __ 
place wi·thin a non~violent society • ~ _ • • Its destruc·ti on -
would constitute a revolutJion in man's thought and insti tu-· 
.L -- - - ~--~ 
tional lif·e. n12 
.. 
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The specific lives of change which would 
··- ki 
-affect police powers,. are de.lineated as the setting up of 
/ 
ttthe machinery necessary ~or res-olution- of inte~group conflict" 
. •.. ~-
and the growth of "an understanding of conditions that might, 
if Ulloorrected, lead_toviolence~tt Fu.rther, 
{ .. 
i ... 
I • 
a hall.mark of such a social order 
would be the continuous, positive effort· 
to root out the soc-ial and psychological 
bases of violence through the develop-
-ment of education 9 mental heal th -services, 
a non~violent police sys~em whose work 
- would be primarily pr.eventi ve o Q o • 
It ( the no.nc:::>violent society) would not - · 
---t·olerate capital punishment, prisions, 
or treatment of mental patients that 
is merely custodial.13 · - _ 
\ 
·This view of a non-violent society _seems to suggest that 
" ) 
such a ~ociety can only. b-e set up when all its members change 
~any of their basic human attributes.· It suggests that there 
will be little or no crime and few criminals, that any proble~s 
'of crime that do exist can be solved rapidly, easily, and 
~ 
- with no mor~ thana·the propagation qf mutual understanding 
between c~fminal and citizen, and that, consequently, there 
--:~- , · ·will be no need for __ a __ c_oerci ve police force. If a society 
could. i.solate' itself entirely from other states such social 
goals are itrot completely inc•onceivable but'·t-'f the non-violent" ~I o 
ii' 
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I I , 
society has to cope with problems ot inter1jlational crime-.. 
..-""'-
.drug-trafficking, gamblillg, corporation.crime, all on a 
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Mafia_· ~cale.~- one remains skeptical about ·1 ts. ability to 
counter these incursi·ons and the willingness of oiher states r 
\. 
' ' 
. 
· ~~-----engag_e .the co8!11operation c;>f _ such an apparently vulnerable 
"' 
socie~y. The civilian-defence state can only resist the 
. 
· advances of internati anal crime· if i:t is capable of achieving · 
and maintaining total homogeneity of opposition· by ·eve-i;y , 
citizen and if it is prepared to act against criminals in 
. ·the same way as it proposes to do against invade~s. For its 
-
integri.ty and· security" against criminal and military attack 
the civilian defence· state is dependent solely qn the main-
·tenance of social cohesion and individual self-discipline.as 
both deterrent to incursion and operable defence should de, ... -~ 
terrer1ce fail. These do· note seem adequate safeguards for .tne 
uninterrupted continuance of social life. I 
The proposaJ. ,for the tetention of ·an armed police :force~ 
,;,/§ ' . 
derives from a view that sees a eiv~lian .. defence state as · 
falling short of th~ requirements of a non-violent society. \ 
. ·, 
The polic,e force would perform essentially the same social 
functions as it does in the modern state-- the preservation 
I -., '.. 
--··••···.·····•··· 
of the soc.ial order, an.d the ma:h.ntenance ot the rule of law. 
rt 1would · operate as· far as possible without · force but would 
retain the option of employing weapons .of various types in, 
-the regulation·· of riots and, disturbances whether these result 
I I ,. 
from poli ti 1cal conflict or natu.ral disaster. In harness wi1th: ( 
elements of the redeployed armed forces-, the police would act 
~ 
-
.. ' 
as an emeFgency rescue force in case of disa.ste·rs ,such ·as 
flooding, landslide, and earthquake. 
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· .. ~the (Jourts and tne · Prisons : 9 , ( 
o·,'..i:,_..- - . . · 
--
a:o nc e p tual proje'cti ons of a n-on-vio_lent s·o.ciety visualize 
.. /') . 
, , ' '~-
·11 ttle _ change . in 'the gen.et.al function of the law courts but 
some significant chari.ges -in "the apprach to sentencing. ·crim-- \ .. 
' , 
inals and to administering the prisons in which they will 
reside. This n~w approach is dictated by philosophical · 
assumptions ·o,f the .pe:rfectibility of man and by .an exaggerated 
belief_ in the efficacy of "enii_ghtened't ref·ormat:ory meth.ods 
•, 
-of s-ocial work. Tn.1.is, it can be claimed /that . 
.. the criminal courts should have only: _ 
the function of d~ciding whether or not-
r . 
the crime has been committed ard the · / -----
accessory factse They should have no / 
'{'•·. .. -.~ power of punishment. Thereafter the / 
case should be handled by physicians, / 
psychiatrists, psychologists, social / 
workers 9 teachers 9 and emplojmen t /// 
·agencies.. ·The object should be not to·· 
make good prisoners but t£4- make·-· crim-.- _, . i·nals. into good citizens. - • 
There.is no.doubt that present pri~on systems encourage cru.elty 
and recidivism but the adoption of the program set out above, · 
while solving those problems, might create others that are 
equally u.ndea.trable, for.example, the need to increase the 
. . ·-- ' 1 
.... 
allocation of men :and money for the prison system, or a 
poli tiela backlash by supporters of n·1aw'n' order;"" with 
the accomp8.!lying potential for low-level, ~ut widespread 
violence. 
· ~ The literature_ of civilian defence is not at all clear. ·_ 
·about the position.of the penal system in society. One line 
of· thinking believes so strongly 1'n the likel''ihoocf of the 
" 
creation of a non-violent soci~ty that it does not care-to . 
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. c·oncern· itself either with' the -problems of · interllai social · •' . ~ .. ~ . ; .'. 
•, 
........ 
:~7 - ~:r~nsition or with the--fe·asibiltty of establishing a c'rime- -· "\ . . ' 
' 
.. 
I. . •-
free society-. The. oth-er line- of thinking strays so.-li ttle 
"· .. - . - . 
. '\ . from pre~ent concepts of the powers df the·- police _ and courts 
in the state as to· suggest that the matter _has :.not been 
. ' ,· 
the -subject_ of anything -but the moEJ:~-- cursory study •. 
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-m!:&.1NON..COERCIV.E POWERS OF -THE GOVERNAIBNT 
' ' ' ' ' ~-- ' , . ' 
--_ ·_ · The non~c_oercive powers of the govermnent are · dis tin"''.< - _ 
. "I I 'te:,,.' 
.. ·-_·ga.ishe.d_~rom the _coercive. powers in a purely physical· sense._ 
.', .. ·. ,. 
- . . \•,•-• 
_C1-oercion is taken_ to mean the -application or physical restraint 
- ··-
by the- govermnent on.indi-viduals or groups. The'' non-coercive 
. . 
' power of the· g,overnmen t may make use of the coercive arm in I 
the last resort to enforce i t·s directives but· it is riot in 
itself set up and ge·ared to that ~nd. ·Indeed, government is 
I , 
,. 
far more a bargaining than -it is a coercive_ process. 
· .. ·., .-·· ' 
The forID.al structures of policy, law, 
and , adminis tra t_i ':P.: are onl? a "·last ~e-
s ort o o cs • Parties- to disputes, in- •· I 
. . -
. ·," i "°!" ·"'· cluding govern.me:r1t agencies 9 do -not go 
to court if they can get satisfactory_ 
adjustment .or compliance by merely 
·:.·· 
... 
.. 
,. 
-·. 
I 
\ 
- .... ;.. 
_threatening,to go to court, or by finding 
o1her ways of trading off values at thjir 
,command to reach amicable settlements. 5 
The tinistrie s of Defence and Foreign Affairs 
... 
Only one of the government's,non-coeroive, :bargaining 
agencies will m1dergo any fundamen.tal str11ctural alteration. 
The abolition of the armed· forces will require the parall~ 
abolition of those departments of the defence ministry which 
/ 
served the military~ To this end, a ministry of civilian 
' .,. 
defence would have t.o- be created, e-i ther imposed on the old. 
,. 
structure or se,'t up from scratch. (In ei-~her case the old 
' . 
ministry's buildings,· personel and perhaps its ~opera..ting 
d 
.... ·····-----··-· 
' ' 
procedures will be· retained.) "The new ministry would nee,d ~ 
': 
. to have st>ecific au1h ori ty to co•ordinate the diverse civi-
- 16 lian defence e:fforts of state and society." The structure 
1 •. , I 
·-:- ,, 
. --· r; 
'J 
\-
" 
. ... -
I 
I {' 
I 
! 
t 
I 
t 
! 
I 
f 
• ! 
t 
I 
f 
I 
t 
i 
Ii 
' l, 1 
i' 
r 
' ! 
- ·- I. 
!, 
1: 
---·-·~a.-.--·-,,.....--d,t =·;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;====·· =lllDI! !!l!!!, ~. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!~---~"····1111· ·-, ·................... .... 
I. 
I· 
-~.' 
--~· . 
~ • ·rs. . . 
" ', ·, 
;.. . . 
.• ~,.,.,.;.,. -.,.,,,·'" ,., ·,.,., .. , ...... ,.. I I' 
,. ' 
.... 
./ •.· -···----·. 
. .... 
' 
. . . . . 
p •.. 36 · 
\ 
_ of the ministry would· b'e~· s·imilar to _ the r~cently developed .-.. ..... ,- .!... 
'. 
·-·defence· ministries _in B~i tain, Canada, · and the u.s-.A. in 
,, ' 
. which the trend is toward the elim·ination of· inter-·se-rvioe 
-::.,- · · ~ivalry and the fusion of all policy--making and resource .t., 
,.r·_ 
/ \ .. 
~:--- . 
.-j--· 
""- . .:.-.. - - ·i'. •• 
' 
-- "• I.~ 
---· -·-
' 
... •• ..Jf'-
allocation in the one central_ ins ti tuti on. This is not to 
assert that the civilian defence.m~nistry would be free of 
inte~na,l disputes and conflicts ~or there would be competing 
.. 
claims from the local civilian defence uni ts, and from other 
institutions·, such as' the trade unions, enlisted in the 
national defence. 
No othe-r major changes in the -ministe~al stru.ctu.re. 
' w_ould · seem to be requ.i:i:ed by ci vj.lian defence al 1h ough many 
.,. · .. 
¢ - minor· shifts1 :itn emphasis would occur. The _diplomatic service, 
depriy.ed of the support of military threats,· would have to 
become adept and tough in legOtiation ana. rely increasingly 
I 
on the pressures that can be exerted or alleyi a.ted through 
econom:iPc~ieasures. Most o-ivilian defence theorists anticipate 
---·--- a growth in economic production : sufficient to provide for 
expansion of trade relations and of distribution of economic 
aid. 17 The foreign ministry,· or pe~h;Ps an agency of' the 
.. 
civilian defence. ministry, would be responsible for ''the 
dissemination abroad of information about the civilian defence 
· country,"18 the propagation of ideas of inteI'IlatiOnal com-
munity and non-violence, and a well-funded program of inter-~ 
,l 
national s·ervice to give aid to other states during emergencies 
· 19 and natural disasters. - Since civilian defence is a method 
. ' )< ' 
( 
of defence relying almost entirely on a defensive posture--
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apart from ist deterre aspect,. it needs~ invasion in.~. order 
·to be effective-;.. some methods of offensive 9peration have 
. 
to be devised if the state is not to appear totally vulnerable • 
li 
!hese. offensive powers would be·.·especially required .·du.ring 
." .. , ... · the ·"period·'· of transarmament when the UI1i~atera1· initiative 
I 
" 
of abolishing armaments and. the. military system would be closely 
watched f@r· exploitable. weaknesses. 
I •• 
.• 
!he Economy -, (J I . •· 
... 
ef • 
One: of the main argwrlen ts in favour of civilian defence 
is that it would co~t less than military defence. V Global 
expenditure on armaments runs currently at about $182 billion 
per ye~r, a figure equivalent to 7 "to 8 per cent of the world's . 
:~ total inc~~e. It wo.uld appear, at first sight, that any other 
••• 1 
··-
• v• ,, 
'(J. 
. ~. 
. i 
system of defenc~ ·could not possibly cost more than this, but 
it might well cost the.same. Although little or no investi-
. gatioa has been done on the economic impact of a civilian 
defence poli-cy there has been substantial study of a parallel· 
situation-- the economy after general and complete disarmament. 
The fundamental assumptions about the economic effect of 
general and COijPlete disarmament were tm t it "would come about 
~ 
gradually over a number of years and · that re due ti ons in defence- ... 
' 
spending.would be offse~ in part by expenditures on an inter-
t . i 1 t 1 t·h .- . t ~20 na iona arms .con ro au ori y. -- · · (The~ second assumption 
has been qutistio:ned by those who believe that satellite in~ 
" 
.. . " . \ . . I I ' 
spection· at a fraction· of the cost and that conseque:p.tly ''the 
. . 
. ·P:roblem of maintaining· .the economy in· hig~.' ~gear" is more 
,. . .. . .I 
. . , 
·~. . . _. . 
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. 
challenging fuan origiDally comtemplated. 21) The period of 
conversion-.- or transarmament-- i·s----pe~haps indeterminable ;:.:, 
. - --·· ' 
-al though the suggestion, has been made that ":a two-year tran-
··si :tion: period is probably. the mininiu.m. necessary_ on economic 
considerations alone.!"22 .In oomparis()n to a disarmament ..... 
' 
· system, with or without an international arms control authority,.· . 
:<\ ~ 
civilian defence would demand a continuing outlay on modes 
· of defence~- on training, education, stockpiling of food and 
. 
. fuel, and on foreign aid, the offensive arm of the system. :,_ 
It has been asserted that "the magni.tude of the economic 
problem is not formidable. It would be no larger than that 
experienced by na*tional economies,as. a consequence· of cyclical 
' instability and economic development. 1123 This seems to be a 
.. 
... . 
dangerous assumption. The cyclical instabilities and processes 
d a 
of development of the past have all taken place ·m.thin econ-. 
omies either preparing military deterrence in peace-time or 
engaged iin war-time production. It is, therefcre, erroneous · 
to argu.e from past ex~eriences of partial disarmament that 
. ' the copiplete abolition of arms will have no greater impact 
on the economy than th.e historical fluctuations of ecoriomies 
'... . . 
operating under the expectation,~ the fe~r the· consequence 
of war. Thus, "the- relative smoothness•· of, fo+ example, -the 
British transition from the.wartime situation of· 1920-1945, 
· through demobilization, to 1he peacetime economy. of the 1950's 
'· 
~· 
can b.e explained by ttthe backlog of demand built up during ·· 
the war years, coup~ed with the fact that consumers had the 
money to transl8. te these demands into actual purchases, ~2-4 
·~.-1 .. •·•·i 
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. . ::. ' and. by the demand for increased production: occasioned by the; 
Korean War. -These unusual. conditions will not -,be present in· . :~. 
' 
civilian d~fence state even if it. is constatly under threat· . . ; 
. " 
~-
. 
. ) 
- - . . ,,-- -···· of ·war, or engaged in some form of minor co:nflict, since its 
·defence .depends not on the production of material but on.the 
' 
I 
attitudes and actions of men. / 
, I . 
e·i vilian defence would bring about an am.bivalent change 
J, in the .economy: whereas the government would· probably not. 
have to alter its current arrangement of.minis-tries, "no .. 
~ 
.. 
seginent" of the economy 1 tself would "'escape the turbulence" 25_ 
of the change. I . . ~ the economy at large. armaments manufacturers. 
would disappear· (some might be able to convert to similar· 
. ~ . 
- lines of 4 produc·ti on), vast numbers ., of workers· would become 
~ 
. unemployed and would migrate, perhaps even on the scale of 
. the , Okie migra ti oris in the U.S.A. in the 1930·' s, · from one 
' 
region of the ·country to others whe.re .. employmen~ was available. 
rt is only if the impact was of this dimension that the 
! 
" ) government would hav.e to do substantially more than· maintain 
.. high consumer demand, stimulate.non-military production, 
increase public spending,·· and provide· ad·equate · short-term and \~ 
' 
. 
. 
. long~term compensation for the unemployed. In the large in-· 
dustrial states ·of the ·west a considerable administrative 
. "'apparatµ~. aJ.ready exists to- provide unemployment compensation 
' (.l 
and supplementary incomes bµt, if the civilian defence state 
;was~ not at such a high stage of -~e"!eJ. __ 9_pment, the dislocation • I', ... 
. 
' caused. by the cessation _of defenc·-e industries might throw Sl1 
unbearable burden on the goverrimen t. _The extent of the _·g_rJv-
• I ' 
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'.ernemen,. ~e extent of the government•:s role during economic, 
\I;.,.~· 
• ',>r•·.·,·.1 
-- -:··- :" -- --·· tras11;1on woiird 1arge1y· a.epend.· oll ·1 ts ·ab11i ty 
-· . ·,. 
; 
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·-
. to· maintain its total .. level of ex- . penditure during tbe period .an.d thus to instill a spirit of confidence in the persons and companies affected. ,, 
~here is certain to be considered 
· · need for consultation wi. th the in-.. ~ . dustries arid trade unions concerned, 
· both to explain government policy and to minimize the possibility of mis-
rmderstandings occuring, and to seek 
·their help in finding workable solu-tions.26 
... 
. .... · .. · 
:•. 
It is historically -aemonst~abl e·, even proven, that "in- · 
tensive warfare fosters the extention of governmental regulation 
and monocratization •. t1;27 W1)uld civiliah defence create a similar 
' condition,· or could it reverse to some extent the modern t
1
rend 
\ 
l 
, 
. ' toward political and economic centralization?_ Centralization 
is· .. one of the prime fears of civilian defence theorists 
whose policies have been evolved as a reaction to twentieth 
cen~ry totalitarianism ari-d in the belief that decentralized 
regimes are harder to overthrow than centralized ones. 
· ·,In economic matters/ central planning, though not necessarily 
central control, seems to be firmly extablished. · The modern 
complex, centralized ec.onom.Y needs "to be co-ordinated at local 
... ..,. ; 
as well as national levels''28 but this co-ordination may be a 
process of bargaining in which the ''mutually sati 1sfactory" 0 '. 
- I . 
' agre~ment be-twee,n th·e··regional and· the national ·level :is mo·re 
often satisfactory· to the central than to the regional. gov-_·· 
.; 
,•, ernment. ''Econo~ic decentralization ••• is almost synonym.ous 
with econolllic backwardnessn 29 and the ci vilia~ defence state, ' 
' 
')•• 
,' 
. . ~ ... 
, ...... , 
.mpre than any. Qther_ .. cannot afford to be economically back-
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·ward. when it is also militarily vu1nerable. 
.. --
. . The foundation of civilian defence is the independent,. . . 
disciplined activity of its citizens in resisting invasion 
! 
a!ld the co-ordination and direction of such activities by local, 
. regional and natiorial authorities. Presumably the lower levels 
of thip structure would be subordinate and responsible to the 
higher ones, culminating in the policy-making body of the 
ci vi ian defence ministry. _ ttit may be. f e~red that such a t:· 
ministry, involving itself in so many aspects of society. 
would become too powerful" and, perhaps in anticipation of 
0 . 
'\,"' ... 
• • 
. ; 
this danger, , it is proposed to haite an alternative means of .. 4 , 
s·ocial and political organization·~e-0nsisting of oi tizens' 
c_ouheils instituted at the lowest level in the form cof cells. 30 ~ ,.. . ··~ -
. ' 
The problem Of centralization has evidently worried civilian 
• 
- defence theorists but they have not yet produced a fi,rm 
solution. 
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THE. IMPACT OF CIVILIAN DEFENCE ON . '. .. --~ . J . 
~·., 
THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ORDER - · r 
/ -, 
. 
' Specialists.in soeiologioal theory have remarkably little to say about 
·a.iscordant elements in _social systems 
and even less about so·cial change or 
the viability of the social order, _ 
under conditions of crisiso There is 
one common assumption'in sociological 
the~cy-~ ihat societies are self= equi-librating systems==._<=;> which makes a con-
sideration ·of change very difficult. Yet the crude facts of change provide 
a rather severe challenge to a social theory that abstracts from dynamics or -treats it only as an exogenous varil:l,ble. 3l .· 
"' • ~ .. ! • ~ - • 
Civilian defence is certainly a ''-cru.de fact of change" and 
one ~has to ask hew- -the s·ocial order will assimilate it into 
the prevailing stru.cture; to ask--whetb.er or not society is 
self-equilibrating; to discover what degree of government 
,,- : -,-~ 
·I ,.-
- . \ 
. -:",-. 
act,;ion still allows society to be characterized as self- ' f _, 
equilibrating; and to discover how much government action is 
·c,Y 
.. ·.·"'·. - required· tg_ avoid calamity. The direction of these lines of 
'· . 
inquiry will be in observing the impact of civ::ilian defenc-e 
. ·-···--··---·-· 
· on society primarily from the bottom upwards, fron1: the per-
spective of the governe.d rather .::than the_ governors. 
the sucessful state is marked by a close correspondenc.f;! _ 
. ,..-·""'\ 
. betw .. ~~!J.,"·:sometimes the co-incidence of, the :functi OllS of the 
government 8.nd the expectations. an.d aspirations of the _ 
_ governed. The -first functi on is to __ ensure pol.itical -and ·· · · · 
"· '. , , ' """-· ·,. SOCial stability, indicated by the absence of disturbance in 
' . 
•>!. •• -
. . ' 
:,. ; . 
' 
the form of crime, revoluti·on, or war. The achievement. of . ~-: 
this stability and its long~term preservation produce~ -f-- I 
ll. • 
• ' I 
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. e_gually important. sort of·· ·stability; ·the p~ychologioal calm '. J' f 
' 
--"'·~· - .of the individual. The second function is the· provision of 
·~-
\ 
•• ,Jl.~·-~ 
' ,, 
Q 
adequate :food, shelter, warmth, and purchasing power through·" \ 
-· both. the market ·mechanism and government sub·sidy. In .pre- . 
. I) industrial societies the physical welfare of the individual 
is- usually the resp-onsibili ty of- his immediate family., ~is 
' 
village or hi~ tribe; _in industrial societies increasingly-·-·· 
. the resp.onsibili ty of the state. The third function is to 
·preserve as far as \possible the privacy and selfLa.eterminacy 
of. the individ~al's life, and, to ihis end, to restrict to ; .. 
. 
' 
.. acceptabl~ limits the interference of publi.c (i.e. government) 
andi:-··yprivate (i.e. industry, etc.) bureaucracy. Tied to this 
:,.;_ 
i~ the fourth function of instituting some method of political 
. consultation· between governors and governed such that the - - · - l ,,. 
' 
balance is maintained between individttal participation and 
... 
} 
.... 
admini.strative ~fficiency. · A civilian defence government, 
no less than any other, must ~ttempt "to meet these aspirations, 
-~ to fulfill the~e fu:n.cti..ons. 
Political and Soc:ial Stability 
-, ' 
-
~ivilian defence need -not req¢.re "a total absence of 
---· -·-----·-···-- violence • • • but ~~ might prove- desirable to attempt .to 
develop or extend the uj:i'e of non-violent methods in, for " 
~ 
example, industrial and political struggles. ~32 It would seem 
' j 
,. 
·--r·•m. . 
-. not only desirable·--but almost inevitable to do this since the 
, adoption of civilian defence presumably ~~dicatee an existing 
accepta.n,ce of non-violent principles and pr~ctices in int~a-· 
... .'. .... ---- ~ 
....._-i. • I · 
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. social conflict and . a distinct propen~i ty to extend the 
us•,·:,to international oonfl ict.. In. both its national and 
international :co.rms therefor.·e, civilian ·defence would dictate 
· several. psychological and institutional changes ani these 
changes would have·to come about peacefully in ·order to demon-
strata publicly t~e character of civilian defence. 
The problem of bringing about change . peacefully ·has ha~ed 
\ every genera·:tion. In the 1930' s it was observed that \\, 
' 
'"'·. 
change was the law of human existence. Hence the pages of his·tory. The world 
would never· stand .still •. The problem 
was, not to ensure that change should 
. no longer happen=:,c= that was inconcei vall~e~-but to see ·that it should 'henceforth { 
' 
:~a,;~,,r happen except by.peaceful 
And twenty-five years .... :.l.ater the •ttruthn, was again acknowledged 
that. 
continuous change is of the essence 
of human life. To-try to halt change 
ts .to court an explosion. The , con-
structive way of dealing with the in-
evitability of change is to make changes 
volunta3!1~ before they impose them~ 
.selves • 
.. 
----, 
. \ 
... Civilain defnece~olaims·to aspiring to this on·the international 
= plane, but one must"_~sk-whether its advocated are prepared 
-·------·-'·-······· ··-··-··--· 
· for the changes within the civilian defenc·e· state that- will ' '\ 
.. 
... , 
certainly need to accompany· it. One shares the espectation 
,:(- . 
of Moore and Feldman that "there will. be some unanticipated 
.,.,, 
conseque_nces of virtually any deliberate change, and our .,.. 
.. further expectation that not every one of them will have a 
positive sign by- i·t. 1135 
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'l!h~ changes· . inherent tn· a ciyilian ·defence. society, . tho-µgb. 
"UJl&nticipa ted, may be · conquerable. if they are introduced de- · 
liberatly and carefully. An •immense detritus of beliefs and 
I •• ~ • · thoughts"'36· accumulated by ~-society over time determines 
the extent, direction, and timing·· of cha!lge. If this were 
.I 
. 
~o be disregarded, unanticipated consequences would certainly 
be- marked by negative signs. History is rep'let·e with examples 
of imposed change and i~s unanticipated consequences, both 
' benevolent and malevolent. The civilian defence .state will 
only accede to the changes it favours. There ·are· n.o grotmds 
for.believing that it will not resist changes thought to be 
destructive of ·its structure.-. As a staft, one wonders what. 
will be the social effect of the disapproval and ·~ventua.lly -
c:.;p, 
· the eradication. of 0011-ecti ve violence. · In Western societies ~ t 0 -
~col.lective violence has flowed regularly out of the central 
- political processesn37 and, ''furthermo;re., instead of con-
sti tutiiig a ·sharp break from ~normal' politic-al life, 
. " 
' 
'1-
violent protests ~end to accompany, complement, and extend ·. 
organized peaceful attemptstt38 togain political objectives. 
,, 
Because violence has been institutionalized does not, of course, 
+../ -
mean that is ]10t amenable to -mo·difioation, but what has.· 
..... --- . 
_ happened in the past is not the elimination of violence from 
the politio_al process but its conta~/p:ment in one area and its 
shift to another. One hestitates ·to suggest it, bu~. societies,· 
: -~ e·spe_cially· twentieth-century societies, seem unable _to exist · 
without some form of collective violence at some leve1. 39 
. . 
crollective .violence d·oes_ not. py its nature· produce instability · 
··1 . ' 
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P• 46 · but-neither does it guarantee· stability-. Would its·absence produce stability? Or i~~tability? The answer is .presumably 
. 
. that a completely non-violent society would. produce neither in pure form, but that p.Qli tical conflict would mere_ly be 
. 
I 
I less destructive than in 'a· s.ociety where disput®JS were still 
. regulated by violence. ·Non-violent instability might be just as prevalent as violent instability-and there can be no 
. 
. 
certainty that the impact of the form.er will be any lea's· ·-----debilitating to the social structure than the latter. Indeed, since non-violent action is designed as a long-range strategy of persuasion and sanction, the disruption 0f society i~ causes will last far longer and may, thereby, strike more effectitvely at social '1and. pol·i tical stability than the rapid 
·intervention of a coup d'etat, or riot. (I do not.intend to resu!rect the· myth of: the general. strike.) Further, ~e have ~-
. 
.. I 
.. 
. ~ ... 
:·~ :·. 
. .:." ... j·· 
already remarked on,, the pos·sible vulnerability of. society during transarmament. 
f Criminal-threats to the political and social stability of a non-violent society can be answered only by the fulfill-
. "", ment of all. the unkept promises", of social and penal, reform,, 
-in education, housing, public heal th, employm'ent, and in the---. .5 ,' _,.., ' penal sys·tem. But, ". 
-~- ~ no method of dealing with crime can enti.rely eliminate sufferi~g. Ruthles-sness and capital punishment, 
J 
-~-'- -~ 
ori. the or1e ·· hand,- and i:qeff ec ti ve restraint, on the othe~,. produce 
·, 
. .. , ..... 
-terrible havoc. The imprisonment of a criminal likewise causes suffering to his farnily arid to the man himself. If, however, during t.l'J.e period .of' separatior1 from · 
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, 
society, redemptive processes .• -.are. brought to bear ••• , the result may ; ··1 be deliverance from anti~social 
tendencies or habits, and the 
restoration of the individual to 
his .family and to society.4 1 . 
··~-.. · :-p·. • · 47 
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. ' . . . 
-~he t~ntative nature of this conclusion is ec~oed when ·one_ 
considers the probability of sweeping social reforms being 
epacted by any society, the probability of the reforms being 
·uni_,formly successful, and the probability that no· addi ti.or1al 
" 
'." crime-promot_ing conditions will not· be created. Furthermore, 
such r~forms would not n.ecessarily have any effect at all on 
rtwhite collar"::crime. Jf tlle social conditior1s ·of a civilian 
,, . ni. ' ~ / • 
. 
-. 
- -·;._:· ... defence state failed to 'inbibi t the growth of whi. e collar·. 
"crime the financial loss to society,
1 
would of i tse f be large, 
. \ 
- ' 
b1l.t_ more important flloul·d be 
.· . · .· the/damage to social relations. 
Whitlff/ collar crimes violate trust 
. and ther.ef·ore create. distrust>; this lowers social morale· and produces 
social disir1tegration. Many of the 
white collar crimes attack the 
fundamental principles of ••• (social) 
institutions. Ordinary crimes, on 
__ the other hand, produce little 
eff?ct on so~ial. ins!~ tutior1s or 
soc1al.organ1zat1on. ·~·· 
·~ In at-non-viole.nt_ society where trust plays a. crucial role : 
• a 
...... . 
in regulating ir1te.rpe·rsonai· rel~tions, means of curtail·ing. 
... 
·white --~-eolTar cri·me would r1eeq. .. to be ·considerably more wid·e-
·~ 
··-
~- •j 
. , ....... -
ranging in. scope and rapid. i!l op-eration than are the present, . 
-
,irifrequentl.y applied coe.roi_v-e methQds; 
The preservation of the social order ·from the inroads 
. 
' 
of,_" crime. may be made more difficult by the ~limination o~ the . ' 
. . 
military· force wp.ich,· traditionally ir1 the· :European experi·ence 
· an.d currently ·in most other states, hav~ absorbed th.e criminal 
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•• 1'11 , ........... --., ... . 
;. - ;., , ··-·· •• r..,; . .J. • ' ". •• ... ·,;:r;: · .. ,- ~ ... •,. 
. . . 
l" ,.~ '.'' 
·-;-·-·· 
. , - . 
:·--"~:.s,·.:a;:-·.-.'·.:;·.\~:> ···:::_, -.~ -~.-,---... ,.·.,u·.-~"'"" >~ ·-~ .• ., .,.....,..,.. ----~ ........ -~.,.,,.------~ _...,._. .. - .. 
.. ···:~----.. -:-:·---:~--~~-~~~~.·;·····::-:_ ..... _:;;,;;:~--.. ~--- . 
. . 
I• 
"-. . 
· '..•, ';:-· ·· '• ', . ,· .. -.·'.,\,.,'.'··.-·,·.•.·.·.'··· ... ~.-., ...··.'.,_.•· · .. •.· ... '. . ·.·.•.· . :_<.·.,:,.,·.·.:.·.:. .. -,·.\,,· ... '.c.··.·;:._-.~.-.,.··,:.',-.·.'.,., .. :.-,.·.·, .. ,·.·.',·.',-,,=.·_;:.. ..'. .··,·. :.'.·,• . :,,,-,','..C .. :··,,,-.•.'.-,·,/.:,_.·.· .• '.· -,·.·.:,_i_-.,,.~-·-... .···."····',:··'.,. '.-.·.·. ·.· .. . :, ·,·-'. ... · · ·.:._: . , · · ..,, -.- ··_· .. "'-,- ·•\, :~·. · 1,~··,.-c, ·;-;·. · · .";---,,- .·-;.·--=-,......_.,....:._..:....,. ' -'- . •' ,._ ,._,. - ' -- -..-:- .... ,··. -:°., . .-'_;,,'";.,,"_-•_:__-,·.":•: .. ~-·--.:-'_:,;·.-;:'i'i:''-.. t;_'.'-".'.:-.':-_,,',:.:.\_;;· ... --. ,·a)'·.;, ·)".,_"-''•';-~ .:- ·;f.:,•t;:;;~,:;,i'..,;'.>~(\.-;_) I • --lilllllllilllllliillllliliiilliiiiiiiiliiiiliiiliilllliiiliiiillllll1111a111a1111111111111111111111........i~..;.;,;;;;;.;..~~~~~ 
- ----
~ .. 
·r .. 
~~· . 
. . ' 
. ... " . .,, . 
, ....... 
p. · 48··c- ·;: ·;:-.,, , ,' 
.• , . element$ of society. It migh~ be claimed that, in the lo:rig-
1 
I 
run, military service 8xace1f>bates rather than cures. criminal · 
te11dencies but the contraey claims ::-that service can be ' 
. \ . 
. ' ' \ 
~-· remedial and. that i t\.l"~movle~/the potential criminal from 
• i , 
\ 
society tor short periods 6,an equally be argued. Civilian· 
\ • ' \ I 'C ' 
defence theorists hav.e not ~onside.re~ this problem even : ; \ 
' --
'. thougb they may subscribe to the "war system'' theory of the 
state. 
. · 1 
r. 
This theory states that 
··-·~---··· 
a culture''~ war system- has been 
the most dramatic, and apparently 
the most determinative, of its 
instit:utional arrangements ••.. The 
war system m1der which we live --
today . .. is a consequence of the 
modern nation-statee It both 
shaped an.d was shaped by the 
emerging concepts of national 
organization, national independence 
and sovereignty, secilar and 
nationally centralized goverr.ar_J.eht ••• 42 
j 
For,eaoh nation~state in the inter;p.ational system, "war itself 
. \ is the basic social system; within which other secondary modes 
43 
of social organization conflict or conspire. Such a theory· 
" seems tO designate a c8.Usal structure betweerl war and_ the ·· . 
' ~ 
state which regard/them as siinplistically and exclusively 
·:o· 
., 
. ·-<. ~ .. ' 
.-,.;: 
interacting institutions, neglecting that "modern war is a J 
-
complicated social institution - the resultant of the if ter-
ID.es~hing of' many intricate fapiors : social, economic, political, 
- • . I 
and psychpTOgical. It involVes, large and complex,.social-
organizations which we call nations."44 
. '",,c;a;.4' 
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/ The theory is set dpwn 
. I 
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• ,. < • J •• . , 
ir1 disapproval of the system and, 
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. in order to express this mood fully, · :the institutional _ 
' . 
ceritrali ty and predominanc.e of war. in the system is 
exaggerated but at the same time it is suggested that war,·,.,-,-_-,-
. .. 
-"like any other social institution ••• is capable of evolution -~ 45 
. -
. and change. 11 The proponents of the. theory first state that 
war is not like any ·other aooial institution, i.e~ that it· 
intrudes in all aspects of the social structure, that, it is 
served by all oth·er soci~l inst:ttutions, and then, in the -
~---------·next breath, they hold out the hope that 'ti t is also poten-
... 
tially eradicao.1e·;-•• a. hope based on the fact. that "other,. 
. 
widespread·so·cial institutions of man's past, lj.ke slavery, -· . 
dueling, ritual human sacrifice, and cannibalism, wh_ioh in 
. their times and milieus seemed equally rooted in hum.an 
. 
. nature and de··st~~.ny, have been, in the course of history, 
\ 
. 
almost totallY eliminated. n46 It is clear that wa.r is . a 
more all-pervasive ins.ti tution, at least than the above exam-
, 
-ples, a.nsl. that it cannot therefore be cons-idered in the same ,J., ~- ''-<i--. 
terms as otner social .institutions. Indeed,· 
, 
it seems probable that· war,will 
.continue to be of dominant political 
_ impo.rtance. so long as the process 
I • 
.... 
: •\._ 
'·\.: ~ 
of community formation and dev'e·lop-men_t remains a process of persuading people to.accept symbols rath~r 
·than a process of enlightening 
· j>8opliit on how 1;1nwant7d conditions can be dealt w1 th. 4 . . -- . 
-· The function of many symbols_in forming communities is 
the provision of ··a set of unifyir1g forces so as to esta"Qlish • 1 ... t 
'}: .. the as a unit capable of eelf-pri>t'ection and 
' - inde.pendent tion. A civili.an defence state would see~ to· 
\ 
; -· ·-.•r I • ". 
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-·-··· ... : . . .abolish some ·of-. these unifying f o~ces. and we have to see 
~-
,· . 
---- _ ....... . :··:· 
C';;, 
•,;t . 
~ .. -_. how far ·_ ·they can. ·be removed~~wi tµout disrupting .the stability .. -
. . 
· · of the state, or qes.troyirig it completely. 
A negative·, b~t unifying, social force is the fear of 
an enemy and the concomitant fear of invasion by an enemy~ 
Civilian defence proposei3 the eradication of the first - tor 
•. 
b~ replaced by a policy· of outward-directed amity - and the' 
readiness to acc·ept, and defeat, the latter. On both an 
--individual and a social level, :fear is "a basic biological 
-
reaction'' which promotes "the p:foper. actions neede.d for ••• 
protection and survival in 1he face of danger. n4S Therefoi-8, 
., 
··it may not be· possible to translate the wish of ab_olishing 
, fear into a· reality without either al taring man's biologi·cal 
structure, or adopting an accul tura~ion progr~mme _of suff-icient 
magnitude to. control .all maladaptiv& responses generated by 
' 
. . 
fear. Invasion by a.n eriemy represents the justiftcation of 
the ini·tial fear of the enemy and there is .a· consequent 
historical tradition of trying:to overcome this :fear without 
.. encouragir1g the physically and psychologically damaging 
\ 
,. . 1.,. i.!4,t /action of invasion. The inhabitants of most areas in th~e 
path of recurrent waves of invaders acquire either a 
submissivear1d. fatalistic resignation. 1or ar1 ~ob~eseior1 with 
·-
.. 
aggressive national preparedness •. 9:ne of the most renowned 
examples of the first a.tti tude is the cas~ of Egypt _of 
• \ ... - . ' 
. I 
l. 
whic-h it could_ be said, UD.til _rec~ntly, that :· "Its people 
'<·· 
' '"··-···!'"""" ·- ... 
are pla.y.things, its-· soi1l is gold, and it belo~ga to those 
0 
, • 4 9 ., -··"t:·-r 
strong erl:ough .to ·~ake: it." · The second attitude is perhaps 
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b~st illus~rated by the .~ase of ~rope. 
.. 
. The -history of· Europe has been 
~i, .: : ' .# . • 
\ r ': .', ' 
. , 
· · · ·"- · such that the danger· to th~ nation 
••• ha_s ger:i.erally been associated with the movement of armies over land frOrltiers 0 It i.i8 probably 
only natural that the peoples of the Continer1t should· be obsessed ·· with the manie d'' invasion and 
should look to the creation of defensive military power as a 
meanB Of protectiOilooo(eVen 
against)the subtle and refined 
·.;-... , 
••• (pre~sure,0of communist subversion) • · .. 
• • ,I; 
The invocation of invasion as a permanent policy woul~ subject 
I, 
. 
' the citizens of the civilian defence state to a condition of !.!_ --,. - - ff 
I 
.,~ . I 
' . . J - . 
' 
' constant wartime readiness·, instead. of allowing them to relax 
. to some degree behind a military shield ~r,:_and it would not 
differ significantly from apolicy based on nuclear weapons. ' 
The destruction from the use of rlucl;ear weapons ~1ould be :;.,)>( 
immeasurably greater than that re~ulting from the most bar-
baric and succeesful invasion and eubjugati.on of a etate but :~ :.-.;. .. '. 
. .... .,., 
' the peychological ·impaGt o! the· conetar1t threat ·~of r1uclear 
deva.statior1_ is probably not very different from that resul-. . 
.•'" 
,-
Q 
< 
ting from an ever-present fear of invasion. · To begin with, 
' nuclear devaatatton, is a sufficier1tly UIJre_etl threat ae to 
. . . 
.. -allow_ most indiv~duals ~-o coritinue their lives in a meaning-
ful fashio~. · (This view ie opposed by Iv.Iargaret Mead who claims . . 
that : t1Wi thout a future for anyone, ar1ywhere·, human life loses 
ite meanip.g. There is.no ratiohale 0 for the.simplest act, no J 
. 51.. . reason to save or to pl_an or to. build ••• ") If the' thteat of ······-
nuclear attack· is un~eal th.e cros.sing of borders by arpted 
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forces ,.cannot but s.eem more .Probable and .more ·r.eal. If the ~ 
• 
ll . threat of nuclear attack, .is real the replacing of a ·nuclear 
" . 
·by ·.a civilian defence policy carri.~g3~ wi ~ it no apparent· . -
advantage in-;:terme of anxiety and panic. levels •. Inde~d, there 
would be one grave disadvantage : the .strong probability that 
the attention :span. of the public is insufficiently long to 
. sustain a par.ticipato.rjr defence eys-tem. Referring to the 
proposedJU.S. civil defence and f~llout shelter programme of 
1961, Waskow and- !Jewman. reveal that "it is clear that among 
.- the .public,. ·a widespread feeling that war is very likely 
can only last from crisis to crisis and cannot be sustair1ed 52 · 
. for any length of time. n In comparis,on to oi vil defence, 
.... :non-violent civilian requires the active, · not the passi,f'e ,---.: .. 
participation of· the public._ On the strength of the civil 
.-:---: . .. . .,. 
defence, experience two outcomes are po_ssible : participation 
in ci.vilian d~,fence, would be increasirigly low and i .. neffective, 
or, high participation would be maintained by governmental 
creation of crises and calamities. 4Ei ther outcome ne·gates the 
intention~.:of civilian·· defence. 
., Nationalism is the prevailing cohesi1ve~-force in the 
' modern state. The attitudes of civilian defence theorists ' 
. , r-· ·, 
. _.towards nationalism are ambivalent. On the one hahd, they are 
critical of the particularist and· exclusi vist aspe-cts of 
-'<><' ~. 
r"·.·· 
. •· 
__ ,.......,~--. 
. 
' 
... natio~lism, ·but on th other, _ they recognise the need· for • .,I ~:.'"J 
-,_-:- -. 
· social cohesion and the role that :h.ationali~m has played j_n : 
preserving it. The criticism of··national and patriotic 
feelings springs from a belief ~hat th~y ean be, -and· are, 
,._. I " .• 
-. ·------- ... ,, ... _ .
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.. •, ,,. _; induced by the manipulation of gove~ents for their own 
purposes,53 that they are nothing mo'.re than inental images 
which are false. but eradicable, arid that they must be· a.ban& 
doned since man either progresses beyond the nation-state or 
he will perish. But this criticism undercuts the roots of the 
inspiration for-- civilian defence - national resistance to 
foreign invasion, as _ .. i.n Denmark between 1,940 and 1945, 
. 
. Hungary in 1956, or Czechoslovak;La in 1968. The more ~ece:f!t. 
theorists have, therefore, had to retract much of their 
foTerunners' invective against nationalism. 
t 
Social cohesion ••• should be 
... 
encouraged because people who 
feel isolated are unlikely to be 
able to_., band together in wartime 
:for active resistance. _On the 
national level, it could be un-
wise for a civilian defence 
nation to try to abolish parades, 
remembrance days for war dead, or Other magifestations of patriotic feeling. 
_.,/ 
,• .. 
·, 
The· remnants of their disapproval of nationalism have 
forced civilian defence theorists to search f·or other unifying 
. forces. It has Peen suggested that social homogenei Jy may 
_ result from a quasi-classl·ess·· social struct1ire.,. or from 
.. 
ethnic or religious h.omogenei ty, or from a political urii ty 
··and a~·ar~ness only·margina.lly informed by national,feelingS. 55 . 
. . 
It is clear that social cohesion may be prod1,1ced in a colle-
--~----·------
·, 
-tiv.i ty _by. force·s · other th~ nationalism or the ~hrea t of :war, 
-:·, ·. 
- bo.th of which characterise modern states, but it is riot at • I ,. t, '· ' 
..::, " 
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.. all clear· whether nit is but a question of t:ime, of skilful 
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propagandism, and of opinion--making men seizing h'is.toric 
' l 
•• 
opportunities , " 5.6 bef o,re the unifyiag :f'orces of the nation-
state will-be brushed away. Group pride·and inter-group 
competitiveness appear to be f·acts of social existence and,~ 
. ' ' . . . . . ' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ' -··· ., .. ,, _.,. ,,,. ··even if thei·r preseri't st·ructu.re i.s ait'ered, . the ·p·reservation ' -
Q • 
·. :) 
. 
·, 
of social stability and unity may continue to require the 
kinds of sacrifices arid cruelties known in the history of 
.. 
the nation-state. If some sort of economic competiveness 
becomes the dominant unifying f.orce there may be little 
!JI; . 
·~" cnan-ge to the hardships- and di~c.ipline required of the 
population. 
~ One must conclude' that. the preservatiori of political 
....... 
and aocial order rests on the accumulation of trust and 
.., 
, 
' 
I confide.nee· in the viability of that order from .both internal 
and external threats. Were this confidence to be weakened, 
. initially 'by the ··cha.t;tge from military to civilian defence, 
or subseque·ntly by disenchantment with· 'civilian defence, 
the effects on the social ahd political order could be cala-
. mi tous •. What will militate against the ~doption of civilian· _ 
, 
defence is the notion that it is too sweepir1g .a· step into· 
the urJmowri, -and-· thi.s noti'on .will be adhered to both at the 
,: 
-.,. 1 l individual and at the govern.mental· level. 
The Provision of Publi,c Welfare, a.:p.d Ind~strial Production -
~ 
, It has already·been emphasised that, thorough government -
- . 
. · pla.rining will be 'needed to nego~e th~ potential economic 
I , 
pitfalls created by c:ivilian defence. At the national level .. 
the gevernme11t will hav~ _tQ , .. retain. the confidence o:f industry, 
.,_ 
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··the unions, and business·-··for: its economic policie~ du;ring 
. \. 
/ ' 
transarmament arJ.d, t\a.t th~ international leve.l, · will have to -- ·- · 
r j 
·-· .. ·.: 
•:.u 
·; ,<1 
' --, , ... - '. 
•• 
-· . 
--~ 
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• v 
·preserve the confidence.of inter-governmental economic-
- i __ ~stitutions like the I.:M.F. and the I.B.R.D., and of. in-ter-
nati·or1al ba~ers, . in o·rder to maintair1 its gold. reserves and 
--~ its international credit stan.ding. 
Within the state, care wil_l have \ to be taken to avoid 
-- ~ 
individual or group deprivation .and panic'. In some measure, 
this may be fo.restalled by the proposed. participatory struct~e 
of the civilian defence state, by its di·sciplined organis~tion, 
' 
- -and by _its alleged savings on armament expenditures. If this 
were so the experiences of the 1939-1945 war might.well.be 
avoided - ''financial distress, diff.icul-ties of food distribu-
• 
tion, · breakdowns in transport, communicat-i·ons, gas, lighting_ 
and water supplies and, _wi"th all these strains, large numbers 
o:f people struggling to escape into" the country,"57where the 
' ... 
--
_enemy's impact was less discernible. Jt would be expected ·_ 
--
that, in_ the event of invasion, such vital necessities would 
remain ur1der the control of the defenders, but we iµust not 
,, ' 
overlook the posslbility of the invading forces making a 
concerted attack onithe essential service~ of the st~te. 
• -'"-''-'~---"'" '--·-- V • ·-:;-p~---, '3 . ._ -- • - - ~· •• - __ ...._ 
. t.h.; 
Again, as was true of social and political stabili ~-y·, either · 
., 
in the event of i.nvasi.ot1 or of a crisis of confidence in the 
civilian defence policy, it is n.ot certain how ir1dividuals 
will react. Mili,tary defe~ce· is· designed to keep war as far 
• I 
-.;_'.,,l'-......--J 
. away as possible from c·i tizens and- their -homeland, partly 
from fear of oalami tous events d-estroying the fabrie of 
- ·-_··society. Calami tie·s "disru.p~_ the exi~ting ne~tv~i'o.rk. -of social, 
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relationships, arid make the social structure chaotic, fluid, 
and' protoplasmic ' ••• ( T) hey are one of the most powerful .. 
factors of sociocult,;_~~l change. 1158 The government of a 
-, . 
·civilian defence state would need "to bear constantly ill mind 
. , . · 59 , 
the possibility that civilian steadfastness might fail·," and 
. . 
that it could perhaps be prevented from failing only DY , ·· . 
planned and.broadcast provisi9n of emerge~cy social servicesV 
. I 
/. large welfare subsidies, Eµ'ld by some measure of guaranteed · __ 
economi·c and social stability. ) 
/ . 
__,_ . ..,.. . r' ... . 
· A l·ess, dramatic but perhaps more recurrent pra.blem will 
arise from . the closing down or conversion of faci;or;ies which 
- ,,~ '"i··. produced armaments er related goods. Under normal practice, 
''when a plant closes, the effect on the workers, their 
. ·: ···: 
famili_es,. and their communities is direct, immediate, and 
60 . _ 
abrupt.'' One of the most disastrous examples of this 
occurred in 1957 -when. the U.S. Department of Defense 
.. 
canpelled the Navajo missile project. 
.... r· :,. , 
Within fortJr-eight hours over 
ten thousand people were given 
their permanent layoff riotices 
and were left to shift for them-
selves in finding other ~Jnploy-
mento The community shuddered. 
with the economic blow to its 
purchasing powero. Family 9 dis-
locations·· resul tedo · Vfu.en the :.~.1 · ... · 
dust settled? the ugly sc·a.rs · 
of wholesale loss of jobsrleft 
the community facing long-·term . ,. 
problems.61 
. I 
./. 
/-
,· 
: ... : ... 
,, 
, 
_ If· this is to be avoided in the chang_ing economic stru.cture 
''II'.' 
i·· ... , .. , ... , .................... , .................. ""'4-... ...:.:.r.., .. 
of· the civilian defence state, ·!=L five-point programme fill 
• . I 
. I 
be <required to p .. rovig.e ,. 1. retraini~, 2. aid in rehiring., 
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,, 3. aid in relocating,. 4 •' unemployment compens~tion, ... -and 
62 5. retirement compensation for those too old to be retrained. """= . 
' 
This sor_t, of programme would be one of the cornerstones of a 
c.ompreher1sive and widely· administered welfare system· designed· · 
to alleviate the initial anxieties caused by a civilian defence 
' . policy and to provide effective on-going services in case of 
• • invasion. 
The impact of civilian defence on the economy· would .... ~. 
necessi tat·e, therefore, an ~xpansion of the welfare services· 
and planned alternatives in product·ion capacity, gradually 
. 
' and sympa_thetic~~~y applied. The problem of opera ting·: ·the .. ~--~·· 
economy during wartime would not differ from previous 
. historieal experiences where emergency measure were ir1vokec! 
. to handle· extensive physical destru.ction,"loss of life, and 
" panic. Civilian defence might ..... ¥bave an advantage in- being 
prepared and organised, for such calami t·ous eventualities 
but, according to Titmuss, so had Britain oeen ·in· the 1939-
1945 war. ''Never be~ore,· in the history o·f warfare, had 
theFe1·..-been so muph study run so many, plans which were 
concerned with the protection and welfare of the women and 63 
children of the nation.•·• Civilian defence.measures should 
follow this~model. 
· Privac·y·, Bu·reaucracy, and Decentralisation 
' 
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-It has already been indicated 9G;hat._·.a.· s-u-e-cessful civilian 
defence -system m~y require increased '·:governm.e~1t p~icipation . ' - ~ ' 
. 
. ' in economic -~d soci,al· ·life. T~is suggestion is .abhorrent ·to 
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. ' ···. "advocat.es-o:r-··civilia.n defence who claim that .. centralisation. 
-
and- bu~.eaucra~tisation are functions of a military-industrial 
society, and can be restricted or rever~ed by the adoption 
.of civilian defence • 
,. 
·. The growth of private and puQlic--·-bureaucracies in· the 
. __ modern nation-state has been. characterised as-· the advent· of 
,-·-
the worst domination of man over man: "the rule-of an 
intricate.system of bureaus.in which no .men, neither· one nor, • • "f. C', . 
.,.- .-, 
• the best, neither the few nor. the many, can be held· responsi. ble, 
. 64 
and which could .be properly called rule by Nobody." Whatever~c 
/ 
the iniquities of this system of rule it has sprung from the 
complex needs of moq.err1 spciety, and has been devised and 
· ct>nceived as the best Ill;eans for coping with emergency 
J 
s·i tu.a ti ons. As SorokiD: says, 
the main uniform effect of 
calamities·· ttpon the political __ 
and social structure of society is an expansion of governmental 
regu.lation 9 regimentationi and 
control of social relationships~ 65 by individuals arid pri va.te groups. . 
·This· exf'ggerated:t·ly apocalyptic view neverthele.ss contains 
c· 
·, substantial truths. A civilian defence state cannot av·oid 
calamities, ·whether they are peculiar to its structure, or 
. endemic to the -·whole interr1ational system. ·How, the~t~~~, 
) 
-·-
. 
·. can it ·avoid calamity-induced bureaucratic centralisation?. 
· In answer, it might be clai-med that -it is in reality the 
recurrence and gravity of wars whi'ch mainly occasion th~ .: . . , 
,;, 
.. growth of '.bureaucracy ·ana centralisation, and, indeed, this 
I ' ,.j 
I 
view is first supported and then denied by··t,ne of. __ the 
\ . 
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. ' 
---- authorities on military society. Andreski initially points 
. ' 
····-· to the 'mutually re·inforcing processes of governmental mono-· 
. . 
· · 
1 
· poly of weapons an<i:- bureaucratic centralisation l?ut, twenty_ . 
pages later, he .statE;'s that we cannot say "whetner th.e 
~ ·connection between the- two is necessary, or whether i.t is 
just a coincidence. Nor can we say whether it is of a univer-
sal nature, or whether it is due to the ·peculiarities of 66 
modern warfare.'' He stresses that the extension of govern-
·mental control may be. due to economic crises and natural 
calamities. War and the consequent militarisation of society 
is therefore a major but not the sole determinant of go·vern-
men t centralisation. 
.. 
11 ·~1\' 1 Ci viliar1 def e·rfce l";purports to be a non-military defence ·~ / 
system but this does not necessarily.mean that it will reject 
m~li tary ~eth·ods of organisation. Al though efforts have been 
made in the theory of civilian defence t·o devise ways of 
~-" 
demilitarising the defence system it may in practice retain 
~ 
. 
. 
military characteris~ics. In any case·, the structure would 
. 
~ have to stand up to the tests o1 war, ·and threats of war; 
_in,sho·rt, would have to function during calamities, and there 
is no guarantee that, in the face of this, centralisation 
could be resiste.d. 
The 'issue of centralisatioE: is crucial to civilian 
.. 
defence for one of the intentions. o,f the state it would 
' . ' 
· shape is the. restoration of deeision~making apparatus. to 
···the individual, and to loqal and regional authorities~ The l 
,--:-...c.:-"' .•. ·,~'---..- -· - ..,; 
purpose of this -po.licy is two-fold. First, it endeavours to 
~escue~·· indivi·dual freedom from bureaucratic tyranny and its. · 
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.. evasive responsibility, and to encourage ·individual awareness .·, ...•. • 
and participation in the political process. Secondly, alld 
· assuming the success of the first ·purpose, a foundation: will 
· have b·een created for the erection of a civilian defence 
" 
-organisation rooted in the 1·ocali ties and, prepared to operate 
' 
. 
in. the event of a C·~llapse of central control. 
, ' Political Participation 
A policy of civilian defence envisions full participation· .. 
of the population in its own defence. In peacetime the duty· 
of the civilian may consist of attending educational an.d 
training progra.mmes at preiodic inte.rvals, being· frequently 
in.touch w~th.his local or regional superiors, ~d l:)erforming 
. -+~-=-:··t-· any specific function for which he has volunteered or to which 
_,.,, . he has been assigned. · In wartime the civilian may·~oe actively. 
irtvolved in his defence function~ during much of his .non-
working day, he~ mayhave to put into operation the ''undergro1lll.d." 
measures occasioned by pa.rtial success <i>f the mnvasion, and, ~ ... ~ . 
in the e~~~t of_the neutralisation of the central government, ~ <> 
he may have to exercise ·strong self-discipline and carry an 
unaccustomed burden of decision-making. In peace -and in war, 
'. . the .individual citizen will be expected to remain·informed, 
-
concerned and active in the p·o-li tical p'rocess. It is his deg-"· 
----;-, . 
. . 
~e_e of· pa:rticipa tion which would be. responsible for deq._isions · 
' ) ' 
... 
. 
'• determining the loss · or· preservation of his politic·ai freedom . · · ,67 
and political society. 
. . The· nature of the· policy raises three questions :,, does· 
the individual citizen have the inclination or the capaci.ty , 
.,. 
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to participate in.defence· decisionaf? can the individual· 
exercise the.self-discipline requireq by civilian defence in 
peace and in war? what woulQ. be the psychological impact on 
'the individual? 
The· d,ecisional capacity and ·1nclination of the ave-rage 
.. ci tizen .. in the mo-dern- state is very low • 
People leave deci~ions to those 
on top, and feel-little of the 
democratic resporisibility of each 
citizen to be well informed, to 
--thinlr, and to let his voice be . 
heard. We have little well-
reasoned public opj.r1ion in 
matters of politics, especial6e 
in matters of foreign policy~ 
\· 
(In some societies, of course, the "democratic responsibility'' 
is not· acknowledged, or- it is crushed by the apparatus · of .· the 
government.)· Only the assumption that civilian defence could 
completely overturn deep-seateq. public apathy gives us any. 
grounds for answering the first question affirmatively, 
although there need be no doubt that active decisional 
participation would be welcomed by certain .)·individuals and 
groups. If the price of liberty and security is eternal 
personal vigilance there.may be many who prefer to decline 
this additional resp.onsibili ty.-
Self-discipline is a ra_re enough phenomenon ... in individuals 
a.s· to make considerati·on -bf social_self-disciplin'.e almost a 
contradiction in terms. .. 
. ' 
Non-violent coercion demands·a 
,stronger self-control, a more 
.· enduring solidarity. of purpose,-. 
a greater capadity for passive 
suffe~ing, a higher ethical 
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· .. development, than most human beings have thus far.attained ••• An unusual-ly heavy draf~ is made upon hum.an 
. emotions and sentimentso 0 oWhich 
, . require(s) a nervous te11sion 
greater than that requireg for the 
ordinary ,conduct of life. 9 . . 
. :'· ~;. 
___ .:,__._ . 
If ··the particip·ation required· of the individual is minimal -
in. a. -c;vi.lian d~fence system run largely by authoritative 
local, regional, and central ·agencies - then his degree of 
eelf-discipl·ine do~s not nee·d· to be high but, sinc·e a highly_ 
authoritative. system is·1 less likely than a participatory one, 
one disputes ~he ability of the majority to raise· its coriduct 
to the level-required in t~e latter. One of the veiled and t 
. 
implicit ass~ptions of c·ivilian defence· is an educated, 
.. . 
I' 
politically developed citizenry. Estimates of what constitutes · 
such .. ·a ci tiz.enry vary from country to co1.U1try but it is 
~ probably nowhere more than fifteer1 or twen.ty pe,r cent of the 
population. The political method of most states i~ designed 
to accomodate this degree "_of education and development 
by combining the advantages of intermittency a.pd permanence. In 
the periodical excitement of the poti·tical campaign, the processes 
of argumentation and persuasion 
have free play, and emotional 
tension rises, with safety, to 
great heightso This, once regis-
tered at the polls, permits the feelings to relax, because they have thereby become more or less 
p-ermar1ently embodied as the public 
will expressed in·law or legal 
procedure, which endure by their · 
ow11 momentum until. contrary fo'rces 
accumul~te in. s:1ffi?ier1t volume 70 .. for their mod1f1cat1on or repeal. 
This process occurs in some form, ~ith differing degrees of 
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-·.·:tormal·ity and frequency, ir1 a~l polities. Civilian defence. 
'. 
often seems to be substituting the ci tiz'en' s advaritages of 
intermittent participatio~ ,_and permanent representative 
governance ·with permanent political participation and inter-
mittent· apolitical relaxation. We do riot all. want to be 
permanently charged political particles and it is for this 
I . 
reas.on that we create political and administrative institutions. 
Unless_ ·civilian defence can prote·ct .and preserve thes.e insti-
tutions with significantly-more success than military defence 
,l 
- 1, 
· the latter is not likely to be· ab.andoned. 
An at.tempt to gauge the psychologic·al impact on the 
individual of the demands of a civilian defence ·policy is 
fraught with methodological problems which, for reasons· of 
time and space, ca.nriot be examined he·re. What, seems. possible 
-is that th.e .c,;i.vilian wi1··1 be"faced with acute dangers an.d 
' ~ 
se'(ere deprivations. He (will r,iave) .to make momentous 
decisi:@ns in the most 1U1accustomed ~i tuatiop.s and to put up 
12 with prolonged hardships the.like of which he has never ~ . 71 . .. . ,,,,, .. 
e~peri.enced." His experience under .civilian defence will ~ 
-, 
not differ greatly from that of civilians subjected to war 
-u.r1der a mili·tary structure of defence. He· still face.a the 
possibility of. all .·forms of territorial .attack and is .further 
committed to permitting the invader to occupy and make use 
. of his own country. Even after extensive training in civilian 
defence methods and principles, and in self-dis-cip,line, '' the 
. 72 
contingency of wholesal_e rieuro·s.is. and panic"· carinot be 
d 
· ruled out. This sort of re.action is within· the boU.llds of 
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·, ..... possibil_i ty and might lead· to more drastic ·reactions;· such -- .._.... . ~-
'• - :;, 
• 
' I 
•,' as suicide or emigration, the latter obviously taking ·plae-e 
prior to and in anticipation, of an invasion .• Any large-scale 
emigratiori .. _ would be exceedingly embarrassing to the oi vilian 
defence state, and it is difficult to visua.lise how it could 
be. controlled. 
............. ,.,- .. , ....... , .. , ........ .- .. , ... . 
. . . 
The more reassuring interpretations of the psychological 
effects of civili~ defence emphasise the be.nefi ts of re-
introducing social challenges, active participation, and · 
decision-malting roles to large rrumbers of apathetic., perhaps 
''lifeless" people. These benefits would not, however, be of 
the same order as those e~olvi:ng from a disarmed .and ordered 
........... 
',• 
\ world in which man's full humanity, his beiief in himself, 
73 and his faith in ··civilisation would be restored. ~ 
The General Impact of Civilian Defence on Society. 
The speculative nature ·of this_ subjeqj.t makes both 
analysis and illustration specious, and militates. against 
accuracy of evaluation. We have tri.ed to outline various 
alterations that civilian defe~ce would imp,ose on the social ~ ! . 
structure and to estimate- in some- way their .co~se·quences. 
" Social structures ··have an 1IDusual oapaci ty for assimilating I• 
.. -.. ~~· ins ti tu ti onal innovations ·but one ·suspects that it would · be ., ', 
overly strained- by the in~roduction of non-violence and 
~-~ vilian d~rence over ariythi11g less than several generations• 
" ...... 
--
Given this sort Qf time scale, the S·Ocial equilibriUID. could ........................ .,~.::,,~:,,. 
-~ 
', t 
bte maintaine.d but·not,without constant, perhaps massive,· 
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. g.overnmental ·supervision. · I~ this -~sense,· Moore and Feldman 
" 
. 
.. were right· to question the sociological assumption of self-,. 
equilibrating soeieties. This·· notion can be further criticised 
··.when a soc·iety ··is in a. condi ticn of crisis .and calamity • 
. ..................... , .. , .. . 
Sorokin has shown that such conditions increase governmer1tal 
control and that, therefore, societies. are not self-.equilib-
ra~ing but require goverrll1lental direction. -This would 
undoubtedly-be the case for civilian defence states, 
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·· ~he Civilian ·Defence· State in ,the International 
'_. • ·~ ,~ r Political System 
PREDICTION Al~D ADVOCACY 
. .. 
. , 
The nuclear age has perhaps. occasion~d graver concern 
• .0 
for man's future than.any other era. The future had always 
been uncertain; now it may be non-existen.t. In resporise to 
th-e dangers of uncertainty and the possibility of annihilation, 
the policy sciences were deve·loped to infuse .more accuracy 
and rationality into policy formation and decision-making. 
The basic purpose of forecasting 
in in.ternatio11al politics is to 
give guidance to those who are 
engaged in foreign affairs and 
to "'reduee and isolate the odd, 
ur1predictable factor", a .. factor ·, 
which can have more ~erious 
consequences ir1 this t,field than '~\ · ~.· 
in ahy other field -of hwp.an 
activi tyo But whereas ir1 ·· · 
~: .:'.·:. 
··.,:-. .·· 
economics, sociology and demo-
graphy~ scie:r1tific forecasting , __ -·· . ' ~ 
' ,· •.. · ~s acceptedp o o oin interr1ational 
affairs any attempt at a. 
systematic forecast of the 
possible course of events is 
regarded with scepticism and 
often with irony .1 · 
- ----
..... 
Extreme scepticism is justly levelled at .forecasting which ' 
appears unscientifically determined. Such· is the ~ase with. 
ci vi--lian defence. It ·represen.ts a future world which ~s 
--------· --
advocated rather than predicted •. It begins from a desire 
I 
rather than an exp~ctation·~ Its theorists 
\ . 
. :.~ 
.· .... 
·assume an undetermined world in 
which· human values, cap.abili ti~·S, 
.'•·l·. 
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· ct.J.oi·ces, and decisi-ons influence 
.. the future. If the values are · __ · · 
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sufficiently aQcepted, the 
capabilities adequate, the choices 
wise, and the ?ecisions implemen2 ted, the values may be realized. . 
. ,, , 
' 
This is a very .different view of the world than the one held 
by the "realists" who 
assume a deterministic world in 
which prediction is possible inso-
far as kr1owledge of the past is so 
complete that a.reliable image o~ 
, ·its structure and future movement 
can be constructed, or insofar-as. 
action can be related to variables 
·defined by reliable statistical 
series.3 
. .. 
The ·latter view reflects a, profotllld reluctance to p·redict, 
the former the ;necessity of doing so •. · 
The chief problem in assessing the advocacy of civilian 
·-.defence theorists is that they set no particular starting 
point for the conversion from military to civilian defence; 
" 
they merely stress i ~s urger1cy. They may o·r may not recognise 
that "national policies and historical processes car1 or1ly· 
start ' ..,at one point in time, and from what is given then and 
4 
-there" but they see:{Il to ·give greater weight to the rar1dom 
character of in~ernational poli ti9al processes which,- alone 
.in a .warlike world, can create peaceful conflict where there-
1' . 
'is:/War, non-violence where there is violence. What is sadly 
more probable is that 'randomr1ess will lead to a re·sul t 
~--·-- . -
opposite to that desireQ. by civilian defence theorists. ·rn 
. ~ . ., -= 
addition, these theorists seem to hold the common, but 
erroneous,:.· assumption that historic~;L; events will lead to 
y 
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a single and definite outcome·,, whereas 1 t is a far more 
-------· . -..::.---.. : -
persuasive argument that the historical process 
starts from a position given ~t 
a ( particular) time ; it contains ; 
an ineradicable random element, 
·· which may be either large or 
-sma.11 in its .effects; and it is 
subject to modification by persistent deterministic causes,_ biases, and influe11ces. which car1 do much to change the distribution 
of probable outcomes but usually 
cannot make any single outcome 
·
1 
ce-rtain. 5 · 
i ' The pursuit of certainty, especially of a single 
c~rta~nty, has been a dominant human habit. It has led man 
to foresee. utopi~s - (and "parhaps if human beings had been 
m·ore nearly agreed as to what a perfect society would be, 6 ' 
they would have come nearer to achieving it''") - ar.1.d to-
. predict events. Advocacy of the first sort emphasises what ~--
-. ~ might- be, where we should go; predictio_n, on the other hand, 
' ' tells, us what is likel:v: to be, where we can go. It is on the 
basis of predictive thought and argument that we must evaluate 
civilian defence, however desirable arid· attractive the world 
of advocacy may appear. We -must take account of the "realistic 
. ' ' . . ' 7 p~obabili_ties" as we11 · as the "logical· possibilities". 
One's confid,ence in- the imminent ir1troduction of tb.e 
· principles of non-vio~_~nce or the policies of civilian· defence 
-..·· .. .. iEf not encouraged by the" abser1pe of. ar1y footnote; · let alone -----------· 
· ch~pter, . on this likelihood in the recent conjectural .studies · 
- .
1 
• 
·. 
_ 8 
. .· · 9 
of Kahn: a:µ,d W,iener, Falk a.nq. M~ndlovi tz, arid the "Futu.riblestt . :, 10 
. 
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--· a.re ineapable of bec·oming part of human existence ; 1 t ·does 
"' 
- mean that they are not imminent. 
'· 
-
. THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL-~SYSTEM 
' ) 
11 The international political system is in a state of 
constant adaptation. It is this motion which enables civili·an i 
"i'"1 defence theorists to visualiBe changes in the.system 
sufficient to bring into existence an operationally viable 
civilian defence sta~e. The present situation of the inter-
national system· can be. characterised by the dominant presence 
of armed, sovereign states organised i~~ alliance groupings 
of varying degrees .of strength and polarity ; a- minute 
proportion of these states possess nuclear weapons, mostly 
held outside any alliance s~ructure, and capable of 
d~stroying the world several times over; the two dominant 
states are· opposed to each othe~ in beliefs, interests, and 
weapons systems, and are capable· of mutual destruction 
' 
.although their present situation is·-one· of mutual deterrerice. 
This armed, coercive system of·opposed alliances and sovereign 
-· 
,,. . 
' ; . Q·o·. 
,... 
.r states appea.,rs to be changirig under -the impact of ir1tegrative 
-
motions of differing intensity; the resurrection of the idea 
,: 
of universal governance in the form of the co-operative 
institutions of the League an.d now the U. N., the growth -of--
functional and regional institutions co-ordinating the actions 
of governments and of non-governmental age·ncies,. and the pain-
fully slow burgeoning, of an awareness of the necessity for 
_, 
-
and advantages of a universal community. The directions 
. . --·-·. ------ ·-
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· which the internat1·onal s:ystem may take are dependent on the 
·political ~ecisions of over 120 sov~reign· states and on the 
collective ·wisdom of these states as expressed in thei~---~ . \ ,) . \ I -
' .\ ' 
. 
. 
co-operative an.d co-ordinatirig insti tutior1s. Political . 
acti-on is designed "to redua~ ·the violence 'attendallt upon ••• 
-
- --( the power struggle) to tolerable min.imums whilst maximising 
12 the achievement of the goals of the political society." If 
mankind can conceive of itself as a political~y integrative 
(if not yet integrated) society ·it can attempt to avoid the 
tragedies of 
--; •,·• 
the militarized international 
poli tic-s •• e (which) operated to 
maximise the violence in ir1ter-
national relations while mini-
-mising the possibility of 
peoples 9 attaining those.goals 
of peace an.d prospeJri ty which 
_they (quite rightfully) hoped 
to secure from the integrati~ global system.13 
I} 
War is the maximisation of violence in the international 
system. It protects the territory and integrity of the state, 
.acts as the major instrument for adjudicating issues and 
. ' determining power relations and, in so doing, revises · 
. boundaries and redistribute-a capital and resources. The 
.twentieth .. century has-·~een:rthe~.:-, rise of .war poter1tial to 
maximum possible violence - the nuclear annihilation of 
', 
·mankind - and it has experienced the historically unpreceden.- ...... --·-- .. . 
ted destruction of millions of lives in war, the simultaneous . J 
ravaging of large portions of two continen·ts - Asia and 
Europe - and capability for destroying two cities in a matter 
.,, 
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of minutes. The institution· of. war. has been str-engtheneq. by 
industrial organisation, improved communications, the resur-
gence of revolutionary nationalism, the rising expectations 
of ex-colonial states, and the growth ofpopulist,-ideological 
.policy-making. And yet, the threat of total annihilation has 
been staved off for twenty-five years, and the prevalence of 
violence in the international system i.s not noticeably 
---•., ' higher tp.an in other epochs. The facts do not bear out the· 
contention that . the present international system con.sis:~s , 
.. 
of states which are all and always ready and willing to go 
I 
' to war. The facts do seem to reveal two mutually deterred 
superpowers possessing nuclear weapons; states which preserve 
·· the · capabili.ty and, under · certain cor1di tions, the will to go 
to war in pursuit of their national interests; states which 
have been lntegra~ed into warless co-operative sub-systems 
of the international system; states whose ability to wage 
war is determined .1>Y one or other of the superpower.a; and 
finally, states which cannot.hope or pretend tp compete for 
. 14 
a share in power relations by· threatening or waging war. 
These five categories clearly overlap at certain points. 
For instance, the western European states of the warless, 
European co-operative sub-system are also states with the 
capacity and the will, subject perhaps··,~o the agreemer.i.t of 
. the U.S.A., to wage certain kinds of limited war outside 
Europe. 
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The Superj)owers r 
ti • ·. 
, . 
· The U.S.A. ~d the .u.s.s.R. have accumulated. a" mountain 
of mutual distrust over the last twenty-five years.which is 
unlikely to be demolished easily or quickly. This-mutual 
/ distrust ~ggravates and inspires the numerous contentious 
issues which have been pursued by the two superpowers during 
the cold war. This fact in itself makes adoption of a civilian 
defence policy by either state a virtual impossibility. In 
., 
.addition, the continuing series of disarmament meetings, arms 
limitation talks, an.d 's11mmi t' conferences~ have resolved few 
contentious or potentially dangerous issues, although many 
have been to some extent neutralised. Disagreement between 
the U~·s.A;~~··a.nd the U.S.S.R. makes a mutually negotiated 
' 
adoption of civilian defence improbable; distru.st makes 
unilateral adoption even more unlikely. 
The superpowers will perseve.re with some form of j,( 
military defence for more fundamental reasons pertaining to 
their nature as the dominant states in the ipternational 
system. To begin, with, they are com.mi tted to e:x:ter1sive 
· alliance policies of one sort ~-or ar1other ,throughout the world 
which would· r1e,cessi tate their giving advance warning 
. 
sufficient to enable their allies to adopt other methoda:·.·1 
of e:··1suring national security. It is hard to conceive of 
c· 
.... (- _,_ ~·-1:_.::., .:I, --r ~ 
' 
· a Europe not. dominated · ar1d occupied by the ~rmed force·s of 
· . N. A. T. O. and the Warsaw Paot url.less all the. issues of the 
' . German· question have been settled to the c·omplete · satis-
faction of the·two superpowers and all European states. This 
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. ·. example underlies the 1·nconceiyabili.ty of. a civilian defence ,,l, 
'.polidy for superpowers with their mail.ifold, universal interests,·----C -~·,. '<) "?: 
. • 
since its adoption ••·would involve reconsideration of foreign . . . . . " . . 15 ' ·---~-· . . .. 
· c~.ommi tmen ts, bases· and te.rri tmries." · 
-
. I 
~-
A militarily disarmed .c-ountry 
could not hold down colonies or 
satellites by forceo lt could not 
send military aid to allied ·govern-
ments ir1 either a local or a · general waro- And it could not 
assert supremacy in its geographi-
cal hemisphere or use troops to influence political events in 
other countries o o o ( C) i vi~1an defence would obviously not be 
com:pa~i?le with the t_!adi tional. 
activities of 'great powers•.i6 
,. 
The internal obstacles to Qivilian defence would be 
magnified by the nature of a superpower. Both the U.S.A. and 
" 
the U.S.S.R. have highly centralised government~l systems, 
.. despite the differences in economic --- structure ar1d poli tic~l · 
·style. Consequently, decentralisation to comply with 
" 
c·ivilian d'efence requirements might prove extremely ·dmfficul t, 
even if it were desired. Furthermore, a vital sector of this 
I 
' centralised apparatus in both states is a complex of ·military, 
. f industrial, 'congressi·onal', and ~labour interest groups which 
would be hard to persuade, harder to dislodge from its 
position of politic.al power, and which, like the G_erman 
··~-. 
. ' 
General Staff in the 1920s·, could preserve i tsel:f until· . . . , 
more favourable circumstances arose. The destruction of -the 
nuclear weapor1s stockpile, co:p.ventional arms, and armament 
factories would require the ~o-operatior1 o~ t~e~-~ ir1terest 
. 
,, groups and would'·1.1ecessi tate ·th~ extensive emergency and· 
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. . , . ..______. ........ Civilian defence has been suggested as an alternative 't < ' - • '· 
to the current .defence :postures of ·the superpowers largely_ . 
. a~ .a result of the· negotiated stalemaJtes of disarmament 
conferences which so "lost in a morass of technicalities, · 
,_ with argumerits this way and that and .well-founded objecti.ons 17 
thatt are met by equally well-four1ded retortse 81 The impasse, 
it is argued, ca~ only .be broken by the unilateral ini tiati~e-
of one of the superpowers; presumably the U.S.A. Civilian 
defence is designed to follow a process of graduated 
· uriilateral disengagement, or disarmament. The process· 
would.endeavour to present the other superpowei, with "an 
unambiguous opportunity to reduce the probability of mutual 
• I 
18 ~ . 
·• 
nuolear 4estruotion." -- It is hoped that the disengaging 
, 
acts of both states will have the effect of "reversing the 
"" 
. 
reciprocally aggressive spiral in which we are now caught 19 
and then making more feasible disarmament n.egotiatio:n.s. '' 
This would not be a short-term process, nor would it be 
free from hazard. Its theoretical advantage is that· ·a low 
order of risk would be maintaiped by the· initiator so long 
as reciprocal action was not forthcoming • 
... 
. .,, ..... ..... 
The initial series of unilateral 
acts would be designed,. to be cum.u.:. 
lative in their tension~reducing 
effect upon the enemy but non-
cumulative ir1 their e:ffect upon. 
our capacity to deliver massive 
retaliation should this-policy 
fail= that is9 the acts woul~ 
not be such as to weaken us 
progressively in the same area 20 
or in the l'survival" area at all.· .· · 
I 
< I 
' 
~· • I 
• 
• < 
-~" 
•. 11.· 
·-·. •I 
. . .·· • ·· .. --~-----·""'.~"'."'--··--""":=~~•r""' 
• 
• ,-,1 ... 
•• 
l 
Ii.· . 
. - .. ~' ~ . 
:·.- .. : ·, . ··:· _., ··.:,:"_·,,-·- '.' -.-, ~.' . ',. ; ,,-.. . . ' - ' , . .,:,-- , . .' ,_: .. ,,;·.,.) 
: i .. 
. I 
.I l: 
. · ..... : .· . . ·•·····75 
.... ~. p. . . ··. 
O_sgood' s pr'opoaal raises three .questions. ,How far can 
. . 
the tension-reducir1g. actions be made am.bigu.ous? What ~:appens · 
be~ow the level of nuclea.r weapons? Can the superpowers agree · 
p 
.. 
to the redistribution of power that would accompany adoption 
·of~civilian defence? 
· The actions and eommuilications of states are formidably 
-nwnerous and ambigu.ously interpreted.· The human mind 
(individual or collective) is able to collect and assess 
only a limited quantity of ir1formation, and it performs this 
operation with sets of pre-coµeeived notions which are highiT 
resistant to contradiction. The almost bewilderingly complex 
world of international politics is "Wllik·ely ~o present 
either superpovver ·with a clear an.d precise interpretation of 
, ~he other's signals and, more funciamentally, the distru.st 
generated in the past may prevent the. most unambiguous· 
signals from being regarded without suspicion. Furthermore, 
what may be tension-reducing to the U.S.A. may appear to be 
(or may be in reality) a threat to the u.s.s.R. The selection 
.. 
of the initiatory acts would therefore require i11.te11s-ive 
' 
study,beforehand.and ideal communicating conditions. 
Osgood's scheme is de.signed to eliminate n11clear weapons 
gr.adually but he obviously expects conver1tional weapons 10.11 
be retained, thus preserving the superpowers' capabili ty·:·~itO 
support world-wide interests arid to maintain superiority over 
.. 
-..,~ .... · all other states·. Once the process of reciprocal d~seiigagement 
• 
b·e.~an, however, it might be possible to extend its cumulative · 
,benefits to the possessio~1 of conventional weapons ant the 
~ 
r- ,·. 1,.L .. s.ettlement· of· poli t:i..'ca1· di_sputes. ·I._ ~ight even generate the 
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eond.i tions precedent to general and opmplete di_sarmament. 
·, 
-,,;:·, 
·r:t the · superpowers decide to abandon the.ir nuclear · 
weapons.they will presumably do so only in :the firm know-
ledge that other nuclear states will follow suit and, 
I 
-- .. simi~arly, they_ would expect .any move to limit conventional 
arms to be copie~ throughout the international system. If 
neither case were true, international power would certainly 
be redistributed, but this would also be true in the event 
. of disarmament which would d~prive the superpowers of their 
. present advantage. The non-nuclear states would gain power 
• 
at the expense of the nuclear states, the small at the 
expense of the large. Thus, "the beneficiaries of disarm.am.eat 
I .. 
. . . II ... 
. ------~ -, .. ' . 
i' 
. / ·: .... 
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/ 
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4 
·are not necessarily the ones who would have to negotiate and· 'f~ 
.,J • -
·- l. 
····1 . ..:.~,....:. 
,-
, 21 
bring it about." 
It can be concluded without much fear of contradiction 
that the sup~rpowers are not promising candidates for 
civilian defence. 
States Preserving the Capability and Will for War 
---Almost all-- statetf, even some of the smallest, have the 
-·oapabili.ty or will to wage war in defence of their vi-tal 
national interests. For some this is a minimal capability,,,. -
even in a~llocal situation against a similarly equipped 
.neighbour ; that is to say-,. their mutual oapabili ty for 
destroying each other is technologically restricted. For 
, 'others, however, such as Chir1a. or Israel_, ·or France and 
Britain outside Europe, both the capability and the will 
- \' :---·-~- -
exist in more than embryonic · o.r hypothetical form. A state 
. I 
I ' 
I 
~~: .. 
~;, .. '. 
'' 
;;.·· .. .,, ...... ,. ....... -,., ....... ; ..... ... 
' \ ··~~-"" 
e 
. P• 77 .· 
·Of this.category is ~likely to relinquish its military : 
_defence if it is either engaged in a struggle for survival, 
or eager to e:xert some form of local, regional or possibly 
un:1:Versal hegembny. Israel is unlikely to dismantle the 
:-~4L 
--- -- - -
, . 
. defensive system which has preserved its integrity and · 
independence .. for twen-ty· years without a regt.onal guarantee 
of political stabliity and conflict resolution, or an 
international guarantee which would serve Israel's interests 
.. as well as, or better than, the present system of defence. 
- --- -- -~ States aspiring to regional hegemony, such as North Vietnam, 
Egypt or China would have to realise that "the policy o:f 
22 civilian defence has an anti-imperialist bias;" as ml1ch · 
biased against revolutionary socialist or communist empires 
as against Western .. or oapi talist ones. 
,. Civilian defence theorists have regarded Britain as 
' 
' perhaps the most promising candidate for civilian defence 
amongst the nuclear·states. Britain is an island state wi-th 
all the defensive advantages of the surrollllding seas. ·rt has 
relinquished almost all of its imperial possessions and 
' 
C 
( interests·- but.less so its attitudes. It is in the process 
of further. cutting back on its military defence expenditures --·---
, I 
. J w~ich are a heavy eco.nomic burden. It has the historical 
- ·- :,- --- •.", 
experience of maseive but not t·otal unilateral disarmament 
after ··the 1914-1918 war, andcof cthe less drastic demobilisa-
tion of the last twen:t;y-five years. It is a member of the 
Atlantic security.community,· the members -el.which deem i~ ,, 
' inconceivable to make war on one·another. And it shares 
_J ' 
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inform.ally in the P.oli tical _pac.ification of Weste~ Eu.rope, 
2 3 , . ·.' - ·-··- ··"·:., ' 
• I. 
· attributed by Aron to the growth_ of industrialism. It 
.possesses strong and stable democratic government and an 
older pa:rliamentary tradition than any other state. British 
· police are unarmed and-t;the· incidence of p·rivate weapon 
ownership is low. Its p.opulation is largely homogeneous and 
social .coohesion is not funq~entally disturbed by the influx 
of immigrants from Europe, Asia, Africa, and the West Indies. 
i.nd finally, B~itain contains a persistently large nucleus 
of people raised in the tradition of nuclear and unilateral 
. disarmament, a nucleus which has spawned much of the li tera-
tu.re on civili·an defence, and which might form the initial 
civilian defence elite. The only immediately apparent reason 
why Britain could not be a civilian defence state is the 
lack of· any previous experience in resisting occupation. The 
morale and organisation gen.erated during the urban bombard-
ments of the 1939-1945 war might, however, form the example 
~ 1 
and basis for establishing a.n·effective system of resistance 
and defence • 
Britain - and any other civilian defence s~ate - would 
' 
' ' have to defend itse~f against four sorts of armed threat: 
........ conventional bombardment, 'blockade, limited or' 'surgical' 
· invasion, and occupation. 
·. British military defence against nuclear \attack relies 
... 
very heavily on factors other than possession of its own 
' 
~--f nuclear weapons - the· protective umbrella "of the U.S.A. and 
:N.A.T.o:, the relative insignificance JJf Britain as a threat 
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-to and therefore a target for the··u.s.S,.R. ,,_and the relatively 
pacified. political nature of Western Europe which may inhibi ._ 
conte~plation of nuclear warfare the)'e. ·Altho1lgh Britain does 
pos..sess the capability for partial retaliation against a 
nuclear attack, it has no defensive capability in the form 
-of an anti-ballistic missile system or a fallout shelter 
- ~ 
programme. Civilian defence does n.ot necessarily lead -to 
surrender in the face of a nuclear threat for the non-
possession of nuclear capabil~ty in the present international 
system has;::~not affected ttthe large- number of nations ••• which, 
while neither nuclear-powers themselves nor allied to a 
nuclear power, are· -neverthele-ss indepen(l.ent and free from 
24 
_ forei~_.domination.u Civilian defence would rely -primarily 
on the moral deterrent that a nuclear state would not launch 
a nuclear attack against a non-nuclear state since the threat 
of the latter to the nuclear state could not warrant such an 
attack. Whether a moral deterrent can work or not, its 
failure would be no more disastrous for Britain than the 
failure of its military deterrent ir1 the fa·ce of a massive 
. nuclear strike by the U.S. S. R. ·once either deterrent no ,q 
longer deters, the destruction of British cities and forces 
could not be prevented by unilateral British action. If, 
I 
however, the nuclear attack on Britain was limited, and 
could remair1 limited, the abolition of military defence 
-
' 
would reduce ·British policy options ,_ to seeking aid from 
another nuclear power, imposing some form of economic and 
diplomatic sanctio:(.l.s on the aggressor, app"eall,~ to world 
1 • T~ 
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opinion and the U.N.·, and improving its civil defer;i.ce methods,,·," 
' 
.-.e~.·g. shelters, fo.od and fuel stockpiles, urban evacuation etc. 
It must be realised that the adoption of civi.lian defence 
~ill:: not assure inviolability from nuclear attack. "Indeed, 
' 
up to now the use of nuclear weapons on non-nuclear ·countries 
has probably been considered more practicable than their 
25 
·use on nuclear countries."· 
• 1 ' 
Conventional bombardment of Britain would avoid the 
overwhelming.moral disapproval.of a nuclear attack and give 
the aggressor state greater control over its attacks and 
threats. The collapse of deterrence in this case would not· 
be symmetrical. Under military defence, missiles and aircraft 
· ·.···would· be available. to repulse the attacker's delivery systems 
and,presumably, retaliatory attacks could be made. Under 
~ 
\"' 
civilian defence, for whioh the premisses and methods are 
.. 
· the same for nuclear and conventional attack, Britain would ·'~"\ 
lack both the capacity to retaliate in an attempt to alter 
the attacker's policy, and the capacity to offer any active 
protec.tion of the British population.°' ~civilian defence· . 
-- would probably be no less vulnerable than military defence 
in the event of nuclear attack but considerably more vul-
nerable to conventional bombardment.· 
"Like. bombing, ••• a blockade would offer few, if any, 
opportunities for direct contact between the popiition oJ 
the civilian defence country and the aggressors." The only 
"\.. 
' ' ' , \. . ' . defence would appear to be e:x:tensi ve stockpiling of foods 
and fuels,· beforehand but, with no way· for Britain itself to 
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. _ force ·the blockade, supplies c·ould not be replenished without 
/t·. ' ,, ' 
· .help fromr:friendly states which could only penetrate the 
. blockade by using methods tnimicable to the state :ta,,- we~e 
aidinge The thought of unarmed attempts to rlll:1- the blockade 
, 
·· makes one shudder. ''Moreover, a strategy which involves 
acceptance of a blockade, either as soon as it is imposed 
··--·······-..... or af,ter token ••. resistance, hardly expresses the spirit of 
27 
defiance which must be at the heart of any defence policy.'' 
' ' -
Civilian defer1.ce. is particularly vulne;rable to a limited 
invasi·-on, al though in the British case the English Channel 
ac·ts ,as a. minor deterrent to the mounting of any expedition 
.:from Europe. Invasion may have several purposes : to pur1ish 
or- terrify t~e populatiqn, to .... aasert claims in a border 
dispute, to?i,acqu.i:ire or destroy certain .installations, or, in 
/',..._ 
the case of a continental state, to cross the territory of 
28 . 
one state to gain.access to a third. It has been suggested 
that border de:t~ce-<.is only symbolic· under a military defence 
29 
system but this neglects_ the strategic qualities of many 
, __ j, 
~ronti~rs and disregards the need to provide equal protection 
to those living near the frontier as· to those in the interior. 
··iJ, 
The suggestion that a border could be symbolically defended 
· · -· . ,, 30 
by a "living wall·of men and women and children" is suriaiy 
not national defence but inhuman exploitation. of the lives 
of the defenders and the m_oral dilemmas. In the case of a · 
border of any length it is·. alsp impractical. 
Civilian defence operates most efficiently where invader ·-· 
becomes occupier, land citizen becomes resister; where~. in 
" 
. ~ / 
... , ... ·-r· - . 
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fact, deterrence has failed and the defending state be.comes 
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. entirely activated in its own de-fende on its .own territory. 
,,·, -
(Civilian detetlce would try, however, to demonstrate the' 
possibility of defensive succe_sa .,under occupation - s-o as 'to 
d.eter any· such acticin):"• 
Non-cooperation with an opponent's 
orders, obstruction of his actions, defiance in face of h~s threats and 
sanctions 9 attempts to encourage 
non-compliance .. among his troops and. 
servants 9 arid the creation· of a 
parallel system of government, are 
among the methods which could be 
employed. 31 . . • 
Tactical details are discussed and explained more fully in 
32 
the studies by an American Friends Service Committee and by ~ 33 
Sir Stephen King-Hall, and in the many writings of Theodor 
Ebert, Adam Roberts, and Gene Sharp. The principle of 
disciplined non-violence which is the core of civilian 
defence has "this unique defensive quality: if you success-
. fully communicate it, it makes you totally immune to threats. 
If it is known ~hat no sanctio11s, no penal ties, no inducements 
34 
can make one behave, them purJ?osive threats are of no avail." 
There is no .doubt that this strategy has worked in limited 
historic.al cases, and Britain (or another state) has the · 
theoretical capability o~ practising it. The·· principle is, 
·therefore, 
·un.deniable, ·but·we have not yet 
' :- ( "' . 
· been givem1evidence that live human 
beings in today's world can so. 
embody the principle~ in their 
organised behaviour as to make 
the.o.(invader) quit the effort, ,/ 
to disarm him of his bureaucrats 
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. _ .· · - ~ · . and soldiers~>- or to dissuade hi.m · 
· - · in advance. 3::, 
,.... .... ~ 
. . ., 
. 
. 
. . _1h,e preceding glance at Brit~in under civilian defence 
h~.s deliberately avoi_ded being ·totally restricted to the 
. Bri-tish situation and has tried to present a general picture 
ot civilian defence -strategy. Civilian defence would take 
essentially the same form in states integrated into a 
co-op~rative sub-system of the interna,ional system, and in 
states dependent on a superpower. The probability of its 
being adopted would not necessarily be the same. In the case 
of the state dependent on a superpower it might be assumed 
that the most preferable condition would be the simultaneous 
,. 
tra.nsarmament of ~he superpower, the least. preferable its 
grudging acceptance of the decision to tra:nsarm unilaterally. 
In' the case of states in a co-operative sub-system the 
preferred action would be the transarmament of the entire 
. ', --· . 
., -. . ~ . 
'-, 
.:". 
.,p ' 
_. 
sub-system, providing that guarantees of its integrity could 
be obtained either through its defence methods or by agree-
ment of the rest of the international system. Indeed, 
alliances within a sub-system of civilian defence states, and -
. 
' 
alliances with states outside the sub-system which have not 
transarmed, would help to maintain the feeling of security 
and might even .be useful instrument-a for the cumulative 
' . spreading of civilian defence. In more practical terms, an 
alliance of civilian defence states could combine the 
functions of co-ordinated aid-giving to developir1g states,· 
provision of educational and techni·eal services, and of 
disaster relief, with the central function· of pr~paring and · 
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Uildertak:i.ng measures to aid an ally under a:ttack. It w.ould · .. 
. be,. in short,, a coll~ctive civilian defence system. . 
The likelihood of a single state or _a group of states 
· adopting civilian defence does not appear to be imminent .. 
among those states capable of exerting credible·, · even 
though limited, p-oli ti cal and military power in the inter-
'.: .. national system. Too much internal and external change would 
have to take place, and t~e direction of history by no means 
. ' 
unambiguouslj points toward a reduction of tension sufficient 
to induce the abandonment of''a behavior. pattern proven valid 36 by millennia of 0experience." .·In India. - in many ways the 
home of modern theories of non-~iolence, it has been realised 
that a foreign policy aimed at , 
reducing international tensions does.not necessarily by itself 
remove international dangers ••• (This) came 9 obviously 9 as some-thing of a shock even to persons in high placeao In 1955 Pa.Iidit 
· Nehru. answered (Edward Ro) Murrow's question whether he regarded Chir1a 
as a threat to India by saying : 
'No, not at-allo Quite practically, looking at the P,icture~ I do not · 
regard any country as a threat to India fl o ·By late 1962 the situation had changed 9 and he spoke of 'our 
wishful thinking that India would 
, not be engaged in a war.' 37 
0-1,_ 
'8··. 
So long as war. remains the arbi tet· of international conflicts, 
most states will continue to rely on military defence. 
The Small.States 
···--· . The fifth cand final caregory of state cor1prises thos~ · 
., .J -
which cannot.hope or pretend to .compete for a share in power 
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relations by threaten~.~g or waging .·war. The ·small states, fo~. - . 
they are usually' so d~signated, ·. appear at first si.ght to be 
. . ~ 
the most likely to adopt civilian defence. The·economic. 
1:>urdens of military defence are proportionately far heavier 
in a small than in.a large state. Small states' adherence to 
· military defenc.e forces them to ''rely upon the very sanctions· 
and means of struggle which they are least equipped to wield 
~ 
and which the regimes most seriously threatening their free-
38 
dom are most capable of using.'' Some small states can, and 
do, rely on alliances with more powerful states in lieu of 
1iheir own defence system. Furthermore, "there are examples 
of relatively small states which are maintaining their· 
independence without any military establishment· and-·-wi thout 
, 39 
'any military alliance"' - (no examples arer:~gi ven, but Costa 
Rica may be a case in point). On the other side of the coin 
howev~r, there are tendencies in and attributes of small 
states which militate against the adoption of civilian 
defer1ce. An army is universally accepted as esse:ntial for 
\I 
a small state. It is a symbol-of national independence and 
prestige. It aids the police fore~ and r~ot squads in main-
taining internal security. It gives limited defence of the 
frontiers1. It serves as an ~mergency f~rce in times of 
·-natural disaster. The army of a small, neutral state also 
serves the prestigious function of being called upon to send 
a contingent to a.U.N. peacekeeping force. In additio~_!. .. 
., ... 
L."··· "because of the generally limited resources of the new states ---· . 
which they serve, the armed forces.are likely·todevelop a 
versatility of fllllc~ion which will integrate them more closely 
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into the .life of the nation thai'i is'often the case elsewhere."fO 
It is in· "the life of-the nation•• that ~he most· serious 
· hindrances to civilian defence are to be :foundo The majority 
. 
. 
. 
. 
of small states are newly created entities lacking an educated ___ _ 
··:..,:;-'~"·1 
c·i tizenry, a tradition of· .. poli tical government:•;. and sootal 
cohesion and homogeneity, ~11 of which are designated as ·pre-
eondi tions for c·ivilian'. defence. One of the most disheartening 
aspects of"th:e newer small states .is their practical retreat 
from the rhetoric of non-violence that at one time seemed to 
---be their domin~t theme. 11 No political leader of a new nation 
has openly aeclared that his·country can operate as an. 
1,1 • 
. 
- 41 
independent nation without a military establishment" and, 
indeed, Tanganyika under President Julius Nyerere "is perhaps 
the only nationalist reg1·me in Africa that seems, to have had 
' a genuine crisis of conscience as to whe·ther to have an.··army 
42 
at all on the attairlment of independence." A further problem 
in a small $mall state adopting civilian defence is that this 
system inay well re'quire more organisation and ever1 higher 
expenditure. than a small, low-cost military defence does. The .. 
·-· value of civilian defence in small states is also questioned 
by···doubts as to its efficiency in controlling and protecting 
b·orderst._.t3. vital ~unction in states especially vulnerable to . 
. 
criminal and economic exploitation ar1d without adequate 
mear1s of retaliation. Poorly guarded borders also leave any--:-
-·._:-":". D ' 
state, but ~specially a small one, prey to guerrilla 
.. 
1 operations mounted either against; the state itself or against 
( 
.. , 
a neighbouring state but based inside. and directed from the 
i 
first state. One· of the more bizarre, but nevertheless 
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troublesome., cases of this kind has been th~ guerrilla ·. , 
operations:·',Of Rwandans and Simbans in Uganda which arose 
, 
. 43 . 
, from mass refugee movements mainly from _the Congo. At this 
,elementary level one doubts the efficiency and speed of 
· civilian defence in neutralising or se·ttling border disputes. 
In the light of -the conflicting evidence on the appli-
cability of civilian defence to small states,, it might be 
advisable to consider how else ·these· states, could be 
adequately defended without the burdens of a military 
establishment. One suggestion is that small_ states are 
·, 
enti.tled to a special measure 
of protection from the inter-
national community. If a ~umber 
of mini=states s> :DJiembers or no.n-iqembers of the United Nations, 
express such a desire, could the Ur1i tad lfations not examine the question of giving them special 
and effective international guarantees agair1st e.xterrJ.al . 
aggression or threat of aggression? This may be less difficult to 
achieve than more ambitious 
schemes in the field of peace ar1d 
. security, _bec~use the mini-states 
are furth!f removed from power-poli tics. ... . · 
The prospects cfor adop""tion of· cfivilian defence appear 
,·:-
gloomy in the l>.!esen1i? intern.ational sy~tem or in a ~ystem 
with similar eh"aracteristics·. We must proceed, there.fore, to 
----------- ·-----·- ~-·"-consider the pre-conditions of systemic -change. 
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C-ondi.tions for Civilian Defence '··:-1,\ - . 
·" . 
. ' 
, . 
' . 
· -The accumulated experience of h'UJU~ history is rich with 
illustrations of the varying patterr1s of human behaviour ; 
so .rich, in fact., that it is possible to de·lve into the 
.... . d~p-ths of the record and find at least one instance ·o:r the 
behaviour pattern you are concerned with. This solitary 
·example can then be used to-suggest that the pattern is not 
. --
- ·. I 
~ ey ond the bounds of possibility and car1 therefore be repeated. 
The argument is that man ___ has infinite potent~ali ty but this 
is to argue that man is an historical abstraction not a 
social being. Man contains within himself the- limits to his. 
/ 
own potentiality. The point is well m~de by John Mander, 
commenting on "Tlon,. Uqbar, Orbis Tertius" by Jorge Luis 
Borges, in which 
- •.••IOI,, 
... -- -
Borges; -once again, is poking fun ":-
at Idealism. To make a map of the 
Empire - by map~making we must 
un.derstand all intellectual 
activity - the geographers (of 
Tlon) are compelled to everl~ 
greater pedantry and absurdi'·ty. 
Starting with a map as large as a 
province 9 they end with a map as 
large as the Empireo The joke is 
.well takeno And the point is 
existentialist; man transcends 
/ any conoept of his nature he may 
choose to devise o Beneath man! s 
labyrinthine hypotheses~ there is 
no all~subsu.ming theory of the 
Ulliverse; there is only raw 
human contingency.l 
. " 
· If your starting point is raw human contingency,. anything is 
possible. The assumption is that all individuals transcend-
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· mere ·e\tents and that, ~herefore,·, their transcending can. 
take any pattern~ meaning the pat·tern of behaviour you .. . , 
prefer. This theory, like the 'etate of nature' theory in 
political thought, disregards the human need for concep.tual 
constructs of prevailing validity, the social habit of 
institution-building, and the proces~es and traditions of 
historical experience.· 
Civilian defence theorists do not hold exactly to the 
.. 
'infinite potentiality' theory but they are pr.one to isolate 
particular human contingencies from the contextual mainstream, 
and to hold these up as demonstrations of possibility. The 
historical examples did not take place under similar condi-
tions, n.or .did they take similar forms. _Some were purely 
· internal - strikes , demo11s tra ti.ons, and si :t-ins, for ·instance; 
-and, of these internal actions, very few were long-term 
campaigns carried out as far as possible acco-rding to the 
precepts of non-violence. The long-term .. campaigr1 is best 
illustrated by the various action~ of Mohandas K. Gandhi 
against the British. Control of intended non~violent actions 
has rarely been complete; violent action-invariably follows 
or accompanies·non-violent campaigns. Control of violence 
is o·bviously· less easily achieved on the international 
plane, al though German resistan.oe to the. Franeo-Belgian 
occupation of the +=tuhr in 1923 was largely non~violent 
·throughout.-· This was, however, a result of 
- the German position and .eapabili ty. The best-known examples 
---· of chiefly non-viol.ent resistance by th~ people 'of one state. ---
. 
. . 
against an invadlrig or occupying state have all been marred 
:t>Y violence, and once again, as-- in the cases of the Danes 
l .•• f' 
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. . . ' and the Norwegians against ~azir:.:tGermany, an~ the Hungarians 
and the Czechs and Slovaks against Soviet Russia, the 
. . 
technique of non-violence was developed because it was'the 
only one open to the defenders, not beeau~~ was the one 
th.ey most preferred. The resistance in these cases was 
-
.· ':--:;-
marked by spontaneity of action, lack of plann;ng, willingness 
to obtain weapons-, and undoubted minor and limited operational 
I 
•1 
successes. It is the claim of civilian defence theorists that 
controlled and organised defensive.actions plarliled as govern-. 
ment policy can achieve major and perhaps unlimited successes • . q,. I 
-But, in the absence of a state adopting a ci,rilian defence 
Ir,· 
policy, advocates have to argue f:rom historical ''parallels': 
,\ ~ 
and the validity of this transference can b~ questioned. On 
King-Hall's suggestion that Britain adop~ civilian defence, 
,. 
the Manchester Guardian's reviewer commented:. 
The parallels that Sir S,tepher1 
. draws with Indian and Irish 
experiences are not valid because 
· ·.at Westmi-nster there was a strong 
and articulate opposition to .. 
repressive policies9 there will be none in Moscowo Parallels with 
Norway are invalid because its [\ people always had· the hope of_ 
liberation 9 and with the Ruhr 
because the remain~er of Gerlllally 
was not occupied. 
'?he parallels are not only invalid.in many ways but they 
are·diverse, both in the conditions and sequences of e?ents, 
·and in the intentions behind their choice as examples. None 
.are examples of tru.e civilian defence; some are illustratior1a 
of principledopposition·to the use of violence per~se; . . 
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some or a s8~r,ch.for ways to engage in ~~nfliets and fight 
wars without killing as many people as under the pre-sent· . · 
system. Others are designed to __ control or eliminate military 
patterns of. behaviour, especially military influer.Ld:e on the ' . 
. 
~it.le and formulation of __ foreign policy. It is i_n many ways-
reassuring to see that this chaos of intentions is becoming 
-, less anarchic and more related to political realities since 
its development within the framework of civilian defence.· 
But, it still remains opposed to conventional channels of 
politi~al theory in its reluctance-to acknowledge any social 
need for institutional orgar1isation, and by its UI1..historical 
sense ··of human possibilities. It may even be that, despite 
GSiildhi, civilian defence is a peciliarly Anglo-Saxon concep-
tion derived from a particular·experience of war as 
1J 
a peripheral rather than a 
central conce:rn of the State - · 
most wars being distant frQntier-
wars against weak opponents 9 ••• (in contrast to societies that 
· were) mili taristic 9 not necessarily · · in an expansionist sense 1 but in the 
sense that the making of war was a ·~:·~·: 
central concern of the state and of 
those educating the nation's youth.3 
With such a perspective it may be relatively easy to 
~ 
. 
contemplate. the e,radication of a:rmed violence between states 
. 
----by a meth-6d like civilian def enee. 
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'?he literature of c1v1l1$.D.-defence concentrates on .... • ·~--~.,.,)...,.,, ~. -"'"'"' •·• •••••-"' • 
. . 
several instances where a twentieth-century state has 
resisted invasion or occupation by another. Many of these 
case studies deal with the non-violent aspects of resistance 
to totalitarian regimes but only the resistance of Denmark 
grew out of previous acquaintance w1 th theories of non- · ',.o=r 
military defence. "In Denmark, alone of all the states in the 
world, a principal issue of -domestic politics in the 1920s 
was a reduction of her exiguous armed fore es into a:z:poliee _ .-4 
force." The issue did not, however, gain political acceptance 
and, 1-fwhen Germany invaded on 9th. April, 1940, Denmark had 
small but ineffectual armed forces and no plan for defence by 
the Danish citizenry. The·Danish government's respon~e was to 
__ seek accomodation with the Germans by negotiation while 
attempting 
,. 
' 
to preserve as far as possible the national values which the 
arrangement with th·e occupying power affectedoooit was the &overnment 0 s minimum responsib1-li ty to mitigate German demands ~1 -to the best of its ability and 
· 'restrict the concessions which 
succeeding situations might 
requireooo(T)his proved to be ari 
. intensely difficult taskoooSince the scope for negotiating was- in inverse ratio to the scale of the issues involved.5 
Ill • 
~--.·-_.:. 
' 
. ' 6 · The policy was accepted by the Danes as "a bi'tter necessity"·· · 
• ._ .. ti . 
.. and, for the first few months of the occupation "there was -" 
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virtuall·y no resistano~ of any kind. Then in the second year· 
of occupation the civilian.population began to -offer forms _of 
.non-violent resistance. The spirit of resistance was born in 
. [ . 7 
- and grew in the civilian population. 11 Civilian defence is desi- --\ j • 
,· ! 
I 
gned to avert such accidental resisttµ1.ce resulting from govern-
mental failure to plan emergency measures. The civilian in1t1a" 
tives began to occur because the policy of negotiations became 
an increasing strain on the Danish government and 111n the 
long run the policy could not be maintained: the tide of war 
____ turned against Germany, a fact which could only intensify the 
German demands, at the same time as the political basis for 8 
Danish concessions crumbled."· The abandoning of the policy 
of negotiations resulted in the use of sabotage and the increase 
of aid" and agents from Britain. Both~;'sabotage and external 
assistance are disoouragedr,]:)y sofue civilian defence theorists · 
as being potentially inimical to a defence based entirely upon 
civilian actions designed to discourage any loss of life. In 
any case, as with other historical examples, Danish resistance 
occurred (1) in the context of a general war so that all 
German resources were not pitted -against Denmark, and a·1d was 
obt-ainable from its informal allies, and (2) before the nuclear 
""'r1 age. 
-Civilian· defence under the protection of an ally appears . 
to -b.e a far more fea·sible proposition than unilateral civilian ~:. · 
d-efence without guar.antees. Al though 1 t does not have an 
organised system of ci v111an action·, this is more or less the 
.Icelandic situation. "Iceland possesses ne1the-r an army nor a 
. :r 
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navy. Under· the North Atlantic Tr~_@,ty, u.s. army, navy and air . 
·' ~ 
' ' . ' 
. forces are stationed in Iceland as the Iceland De.fence, Force~ 
Six armed fishery protection vessels are maintained by the 9 
Government.'' Iceland's main interest is fi-shing, for. the 
. 
protection o.f which si:x: vessels and understandi;n.g relations~ips · 
with N.A.T.o. members are enough. Under the U.S. nuclear ·umbrella 
~celand enjoys the same deterrent defence as other members of 
ll.A.T.O. wit.hout itselt having 0to invest in the techniques of 
nuclear physics and the expense of building its own bombs and 
J ' 
~elivery systems, either of which are way beyond,. its capacity. 
There are other instances of small states in the nuclear 
age deliberating on and, in some ins~ances, adopting non-military 
me·thods of defence inside or outside an alliance structure. 
The Tanganyikan ( as it then was) case has been ref erred ·_t_o 
already. It demonstrates the tussle between the "marked distru·s·t 
of men professionally under arms at hom·e and in inter-African 
relations" and the "f~ith in milit·ary or quasi-military solu-
10 tions to some of the remtining colonial problems in Africa." 
Inithe event, Tanganyika retained its armed forces unttl they 
mutinied in January, 1964, when British hel·p was needed to 
quell the 'uprising. A new army was formed after 1964 and the 
air force is being built up with Canadian instruction and equipe: 
(;J 
··ment. Tanzania has -thus abandoned any application of non-violent 
methods to its national defence as did Sierra Leone for whom· 
- "the security of the diamond field and the frontiers was an. 
n,,·c,,;···· .. , ........... , ... ,.,!-''-'''·'"'·' 11 
overriding faotor. 11 The Brazzaville group, which "includes all 
the' states of Black Africa which were.originally colonized by 
,.~ 
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. France, except Guinea· and Mali 11 - rely on defensive ·alliances 
_- with· France, and on the positioning of French troops on their 
.territory. 
. ' There appears to be only one state ·1n the wor:Ld which 
·. 1· ~0~~~ ... -... ······l(pproximates a civilian defence state so nearly as to have the 
•, 
potential for adopting civilian_ defence policies. Costa Ric.a 
has never had compulsory military service or training. It 
disbanded its army in 1948 and currently has only a militia 
force, between 1,000 and 2,000 men strong. It has two customs 
· launches, one on the Atlantic, one on the Pacific, a tug, and 
other smaller craft. In its defensive arrangements it differs 
very little from Panama but the Panamanian situation cannot be 
compared with the Costa Rican in terms of internal political 
stability and external aid from the U.S.A. B~cause of the Canal 
Zone, Panama has much closer defensive ties with the U.S.A., 
= 
,.--..::,· .. ,,11_.,...•·--. · - :Ji' --h- ~-·, --g11-~ -._.-,h-.. ~·· ·u s "···· - n·· ou ... _- ·e · ,:~; ., '; ' . '. ' • . . 1 j • , . C .' • • • t..;..-.., ,' • ..... • ' 
.. ,. . 
.... guarantee ot' Panamanian independence was 
revoked in 1936. Both Panama and Costa Rica have protection 
under the. O.A.S. and the inter~American s·ystem of arbitration ~-
~ 
-and non-aggression pacts, and from unilateral U.S. act_ion on -~ 
13 demand, as in Costa Rica's dispute w1 th Nicaragua in 1954-195_5 •. 
-Costa Rica has a tradition Of>:·in.1 tiating disarmament proposals 
-in Latin America and o.n 5th. March, 1958,, presented a Draft 
_ 
· Resolution to the Oounc11··of the O.A.S. calling fo~ a_study of-
..., 
-
---- -,~~- --
--
_1 whether 1 t was -possible for Latin Amtrican countries (a) to renounce the use and po·ssibili t·y of . acquiring nuclear weapons 9 ( b) to place greater emphasis on the civilian engineering functions of their armed .fore.es; ( c) to_ .. 
.. ", 
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· 11m1t their military expend·itures; . . ', .~ ·---- --
·and (d) to allocate the funds · · · " I ··-··-·-· .. '· .. ' ' -- '\ ', '· '.II, ' ·,. 
.: obtained by reducing military ex-· 
c'""--·· pendi tures to' th!! financing of 
· national or inter-American econo-
· .. · mic developme:n.t programs. 14 · 
. ' 
Th·e proposal came- to nothing 1n other .Latin ·American states 
largely because the military establishments,· 
possessing much of tne pol1t1ca1·-. power, would perforce have to .ff,:}.1_t·tlJ.t~r.tt¢H! 
acquiesce in a shrinkage of their funds. and po1t1er o This presupposes 
-a.a great de-al more professiona.liza-t1on and·depqliticization of these. 
establishment'$ than has currently· 
. been achievedo Nonmilitary wielders-~ 
of political power in Latin America 
must ,also acquiesce 9 and here we are likely to run into the problem of 
nationalismoooFor nations~ Latin· American and others~ the essential 
attributes o;t.,~ visible sovereignty 
are things like flags and1 embassies. and soldiers and weapons. 5 . 
r' 
.1i' 
Costa Ricanisation is not likely to spread outside Costa Rica 
' 
, where national pride is expressed over educational standards, 
democratic government, and internal stability. These three 
.factors provide a sound basis for civilian defence, paralle-
ling aspects of British society mentioned above. ;osta Ric~ 
has an advantage over Icel-and in that U .s. bases in Iceland 
could provide the excuse for aggressive action by another 
0· 
.;,, 
state·,. a provocation that does not exist in Costa Rica. 
' One·of the reasons why Oosta Rica's 1958 proposal was --,,..-~ . .., ' 
,. . 
fejected is that Latin American, and other, states are 
sensibly wary of disarmi~ "so much is to interrupt the 
· /Jmaintenance of legitimate law and order, including protection 
. '' 
-~-, -
.: ... 
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against the counterinsurgency proble~s posed by communists 
· 1 6 · ~ 
and other subvers1ve.s." The initial reaction to this 
anxiety is t.hat .a civil~an defence state·· 1~ unl1ke:J.y to 
experience guerrilla. warfare S·ince the existence of conditions · 
which give rise to guerrilla war would militate against the 
. 
· 17 ·, 
.adoption of civilian defence in the first place •. Howev-&r, 
guerrilla warfare could be largely ~nspired, supplied·, and 
manned by members of a neighbouring state. If this were so, 
the guerrillas would face. the probl __ em of P.opular rlon-coopera-
tion with a dual instead of a single disadvantage in com-
p~ison to trad~tional guerrilla operations. First, these 
segments - if not all- of the population opposed to them 
would be trained in methads of non-cooperation and organised 
into anti-guerrilla groups. (Joan Bondurant has suggested that 18 
"para-guerrilla strategy" would be most effectively employed 
r-•· 
by a "special force", an anti-guerrilla corps d' el1 te ·, but the 
more persuasive argument is Adam Roberts• insistence that the 
19 general civilian population be used. ) Secondly, guerril,l-as 
rely for their purp.ose and existence on the_ support of the 
people who, in a civilian defence state, would largely or 
entirely ·be opposed to them. The only way for guerrillas to act 
would be by adopti~g the tactics of.surgical, terrorist actions 
which, over a long period, might ,demoralise sections of the 
po.pulation. But, this kind· of across-the-border action then 
ceases to be a true guerrilla operation.-
. More striking than civilian defence and guerrilla act1·on 
; -
. opposed to each other are the s1_m1lar1t1es between the two 
·r--·-, ---·-· --
--w.--·--······~"'··· 
,. 
. 
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,. 
;;,methods. ~here are opportunities to dictate an unlimited war 
to .an opponent des1,r1ng to fight a limited engagement and to 
create such diplomatic embarrassment for· the opponent as to 
comp·e1 him to a settlemel).t. Both techniques also. rely greatly 
. J 
. 
on psychological warf~re though guerrillas supplement this 
... ( 
! 
· · with liberal. dosages of violence. They are b.oth strategies geared 
to the "Spanish complex" - unable to -exclude their opponent .. 
t·hey let him into their area of control and entrap him·. there. 
Historically, neither has been thj preferred strategy of its 
proponent - guerrilla warfare and non-violent re~J.stance are ..............  
the weapons of the weak.· The difference is that a civilian 
defence policy would refuse to adopt the historically- · 
20 
preferr-ed strategy of large, well-equipped, _regular forces. 
The prediction of international trends.has been seen to 
be awkWard and grossly uncertain but it seems fair to suggest 
that guerrilla warfare has a more.definite future in the beha~ 
viour of states than civilian defence. Whether it is successful 
or unsuccessful 1 t is used far more widely beeaus·e it_ is common-
ly regarded as being more effective than the pure use of non-
violence •. It seems, indeed-, that the recent vogue for non~violent 
action may well be over. Certainly, in the U.S.A. the civil 
rights movement became more violent as it appeared to become 
·- more popular because many of the working-class recruits were not 
committed ·to non-v.iolence-~ and because, like Gandhi, ___ Martin 
~ Luther King could 1nsp_1re but- not control his movement and the 
•. 
movement, though 1 t tried __ to remain non-violent, 'Be.came· merged 
, 21 
in the public mind w1 th the riots in the ci t·1e s. This case 
·~ . 
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·. reinforces the . refusal of Africa·• s socia1·1st states to disband 
their armed forces and follow Kwame. Nkrumah's assertion that: 
"·we in Africa ••• put our trust in the awakening conscience of 
mankind whic}:l rejects this primitive barbarism (nuclear weapons), 22 . 
. ·and believe firmly in positive non-violen~ .. '.craction." · Non-
violence and civilian defence do not ,tigure in th-e deliberations 
of s~atesmen, and until it does 1 ts entry into the internati.onal I 
system remains distant. 
CHANGE IN THE SYSTEM -- . 
. ,1 
Systemic change has been. described as occurring 
(a) if an equilibrating process 
of one kind is utterly terminated 
and replaced by some process of 
· another kind whether equilibrating 
or notpoe(or (b)) though most 
former Powers oontinue to exist 
and though there is no complete 
absenc~ of equilibrating features 
in their interactions 9 nevertheless 
the nature of .. the equilibrium (and 
thus of the most significant 
· relationships b~tween the Powers) is transformed. 3 . · 
The changes under (b) are _in the number of, the dimensions of, 
and the logical type of poli t·ical interrelationships between 
systematically connected Powers. It would appear that systemic 
change is --largely dependent on the replacement or termination -l!1 
of an equilibrating process by means ·Of ~~e cumulative effect 
of changes in interrelationships - number, dimension, or type -
which would affect the equilibrating process - war_, the· power, 
. 
-~ 
' 
struggle, the nuclear balance, or whatever·!-, such that the nature 
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. - of the equilibrium·would be transformed. Transarmament to 
_ o~v111an defence, either unilaterally or by multilateral 
agreement would transform interrelationships bet:ween states 
and, either ini tiaily or after cumulative impact-, would be, 
and would be so regarded, as anew equilibrating process. The 
chances are not_ high of s~ch a systemic change beginning from a 
·reconsideration of methods of national defence. 
\ 
' Bo political system of constraint has ever managed either to avoid war 
·permanentlyj or to pr.event the use of . any weapon that a belligerent thought 
.would give it a decisive advantage; 
no nation has been willing to lose a major war rather than refrain from 
using some novel or horrible weapon thought ~o~e destruotive2than the weapons of it~, opponent. 
Prospects for eliminating the present system of militarised 
international politics are thus bleak, despite the pres.ence 
- ,_ 
.. u· 
-,-:: - of some noticeable trends -toward re-appraisal of the concepts 
·' 
··-~ 
and structures of national defence. Among the most note-worthy 
are the realisation of -ithe burden of modern defence expenditure 
-intsemms of its exchange value foD improving domestic society; 
\ the growth, mainly in the Western world, of security communities 
whose members- do not con:template intra-community warfare of any.r-
sort; the realisation that technological advance is probably 
limitless and _therefore shows no signs of ever being_ capable 
., 
. 
of stabilising defence postures a:brany level of sophistication, 
except in the rem~te possibility of a technological monopoly; 
and, finally, t4_F· nurturing o·f a sense of international 
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· comrotinity and .its increasing devotion of human energies to the-
. Practical economic, social, ani political problems of mankind. -. __ ,,.........., 
. Whatever the likelihood of systemic change, it would-result . ' 
~: 
-- from the adoption of civilian defence in\m.uch the sam~ way as 
' 
\ ,· 
'~ ': -·-
\ { ·it would from disarmament which "would beian important variable ,:, tr~sforming 1n indeterminate ways the in ernational scene, and 
••• neither this prospect of influence nor its radical 1n4eter• 25 minacy should be left out of analysis." I 
Attempts to discover existing states ·apable of initiating 
t~ndencies for systemic change Dy transarmlng to civilian 
defence have met with only qualified success in the cases of Britain, Iceland, and Costa Rica. None of them, in their 
present form,·adhere exactly to theoretical conceptions of a 
n~n-violent society .or a civilian defence state, nor do they 
-jibe with the hopes of civilian defence· advocates for spreading the strategy from the top of the international system. Bu-t, 
together with other possible civilian defence states, they do provide some suggestions for setting out the conditions that 
' a state must satisty in order to adopt the policy and operate it successfully: 
'· 
() 
1 • a soc.i1ally cohesive population. 
2. a tradition of democr-atic gov~rnment and its associated freedoms 
·· · 3. a .tradition of"' ob__edience to and discip+ine-
,• 
., 
.-., 
under the · law 
---
.. ,<'4. an educated, polit:i.cally intelligent citizenry with.a record of or potential· for public service and social participation. 
·\ 
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··-J. ·5~ a small military-industrial establishment, or none at all 
. 
' . ' 6. location of the state 111.a minimal-conflict 
.region 
7. no overseas colonies, bases, or interests 
requiring d_~fence, or the capacity and 
will .. to liquidate the.' few that are in the state's possession within a shoit 
space of time 
·t···a t::·· • . a single ~.prote:ctive, alliance·, or a set of · them, designed primarily to deter· the 
contemplation _of aggressive thre.ats 
and actions 
:;\ 
9. external .. sources of economic aid, p-r~pared 
and able to prov1·de emergency supplies in the event of occupation or invasion. 
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